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Facial Challenges to State and
Federal Statutes
Michael C. Dorf*
Courts can hold a statute unconstitutional either on its face or as-applied,
and the standards courts use significantly affect the likelihood of a successful
constitutional challenge. In this article, Professor Dorf analyzes the Supreme
Court's facial challenge doctrine, which purports to restrict facial challenges
to those cases in which a statute can be constitutionally applied in "no set of
circumstances." Professor Dorf argues first that all persons have a right to be
judged by a valid rule of law, and that the Court's current facial challenge
doctrine can only be squared with this right if the Court is employing a pre-
sumption of severability-that unconstitutional aspects of a statute can be sev-
ered from constitutional ones by a process ofjudicial interpretation. Professor
Dorf then discusses the limits imposed on this presumption of severability by
both substantive constitutional law and institutional concerns. In analyzing the
former, he argues that the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which the
Court has recognized limits the applicability of the "no set of circumstances"
test, should be and in fact has been applied outside the First Amendment con-
text in a manner inconsistent with the facial challenge rule. He also argues
that the facial challenge rule is inconsistent with principles offederalism, as it
prevents federal courts from giving proper deference to state courts on issues
of state law. Professor Dorf concludes that the Court's "no set of circum-
stances" test does not accurately reflect the Court's facial challenge doctrine,
and recommends that the Court eschew categorizing constitutional challenges
as either facial or as-applied, focusing instead on the underlying substantive
and institutional issues.
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INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom holds that a court may declare a statute unconstitu-
tional in one of two manners: (1) the court may declare it invalid on its face, or
(2) the court may find the statute unconstitutional as applied to a particular set
of circumstances. The difference is important. If a court holds a statute uncon-
stitutional on its face, the state may not enforce it under any circumstances,
unless an appropriate court narrows its application; in contrast, when a court
holds a statute unconstitutional as applied to particular facts, the state may en-
force the statute in different circumstances.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has purported to disfavor facial chal-
lenges. As the Court stated in United States v. Salerno,1 "[a] facial challenge
to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount success-
fully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid. ' 2 However, as I illustrate with numerous
cases decided both before and after Salerno, the Court has failed to apply this
test. This discrepancy suggests that the Salerno "no set of circumstances" prin-
ciple does not accurately characterize the standard for deciding facial
challenges.
Justice Scalia's recent dissent from the denial of certiorari in Ada v. Guam
1. 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is not facially invalid).
2. Id. at 745.
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Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists3 demonstrates the significance of
whether the Court uses the Salerno test. In Ada, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on Roe v. Wade4 to invalidate a Guam law
that prohibited all abortions except when two independent doctors confirm that
the pregnancy would endanger the woman's life or seriously impair her health.5
After this ruling, the Supreme Court decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 in
which it reaffirmed "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade," including "the right
of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it
without undue interference from the State.' 7 In denying certiorari in Ada, the
Court signaled the obvious: The Guam law was inconsistent with Roe and
Casey and therefore unconstitutional. Yet Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice White, dissented, arguing that because the Guam
statute could be constitutionally applied in some circumstances, such as to
postviability abortions, the court should have upheld the statute against a facial
challenge under Salerno.8
Two Justices have expressly disagreed with Justice Scalia's approach in
Ada, arguing that, at least as applied to abortion regulations, the Court's stan-
dard is one that invalidates laws deemed unconstitutional "in a large fraction of
the cases," not necessarily in every case.9 In contrast, if courts were to measure
a statute's facial validity by asking whether it can be constitutionally applied to
anyone, as Salerno requires, they would have to find a statute facially valid that
includes within its ambit any proscribable conduct, such as some third trimester
3. 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1368 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct 633 (1992).
6. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
7. Id. at 2804.
8. Ada, 113 S. Ct. at 633-34 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., dissenting). The
three Ada dissenters had opposed the reaffirmance of Roe in Casey; their views about facial challenges
may have been colored by their belief that those cases were wrongly decided. In fact, Justice Scalia
avoided using the term "viability," referring instead to "abortions conducted after the point at which the
child may live outside the womb." Id. at 634. Justice Thomas was the only Casey dissenter who did not
join the Ada dissent. His failure to do so may not indicate his true beliefs, for had he voted with the
Chief Justice and Justices White and Scalia, he would have been the fourth vote necessary to grant
certiorari. Justice Thomas may have recognized that granting certiorari would likely have resulted in an
affimnance of the Ninth Circuit's ruling by the same 5-4 margin that decided Casey. (Ada came before
the Court before Justice White announced his intention to retire at the end of the October 1992 Term).
Hence, Justice Thomas' refusal to join the Ada dissent should not necessarily be read as a sign of
disagreement with it.
9. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668, 1668-69 (1993) (O'Connor, J., joined
by Souter, J., concurring). In Fargo, the Court refused to issue a stay pending appeal of a district court
ruling that upheld North Dakota's 24-hour waiting period for abortions. The district court had applied
the reasoning of Justice Scalia's Ada dissent, holding that the plaintiffs "could not mount a successful
facial challenge because they were unable to show 'that no set of circumstances exists under which the
[challenged] provisions would be valid."' Id. at 1668 (quoting Solerno, 481 U.S. at 745). While Jus-
tices O'Connor and Souter ultimately agreed with the district court's judgment that a stay was not
warranted, they emphasized that the district court's reliance on the Ada dissent was misplaced because
the petitioners in Casey had not been required "to show that the [spousal notification] provision would
be invalid in all circumstances." Id. at 1669. Instead, a law restricting abortions "is invalid, if, 'in a
large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a
woman's choice."' Id. (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830 (alterations in the original)).
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abortions. In short, Justice Scalia's application of the Salerno principle to
Guam's abortion law is sound. If there is a flaw in his argument, it lies with
Salerno itself.
This article argues that the Salerno principle is wrong. It neither accurately
reflects the Court's practice with respect to facial challenges, nor is it consistent
with a wide array of legal principles. The proper disposition of a facial chal-
lenge is intimately bound up in questions of substantive constitutional law, in-
stitutional competence, and statutory interpretation.
Throughout this article, I attempt to clarify facial challenge doctrine and its
applications. 10 Part I sets forth the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine.
In brief, if a litigant can show that a statute would be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to her, the court will declare the statute void as applied to that litigant."
This deceptively simple principle does not mean, however, that a statute is
unconstitutional "as applied" only if the litigant challenging the statute has a
constitutional right to engage in the conduct that the statute prohibits or circum-
scribes. Rather, because no one may be judged by an unconstitutional rule of
law,' 2 a statute that has unconstitutional applications cannot be constitutionally
applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not constitutionally privi-
leged, unless the court can sever the unconstitutional applications of the statute
from the constitutionally permitted ones. Part I concludes that the Salerno
principle effectively establishes an irrebuttable presumption that a statute's un-
constitutional applications are severable from its constitutional ones.
Generally, severability is a question of statutory interpretation, not constitu-
tional law.' 3 I argue in Part II, however, that certain constitutional doctrines,
including (1) the Equal Protection Clause and structurally similar constitutional
prohibitions on discriminatory treatment, (2) the concern that some overbroad
statutes will "chill" the exercise of First Amendment and other fundamental
rights, and (3) various constitutional doctrines that use legislative purpose to
10. As commentators have been aware for a considerable period, the Court's treatment of facial
challenges often appears contradictory. See, e.g., Robert P. Gorman, Note, Judging the Statute in the
Light of the Acts of the Defendant, 31 NoTRE DAME LAw. 689, 689 (1956). Gorman notes that the Court
sometimes examines whether a law is invalid on its face, as in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,
453 (1939), and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938). In other cases, however, the Court
examines the constitutionality of the law based on whether the law is invalid as applied to the particular
plaintiff in light of the facts presented, as in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 304 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting), and Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912).
Gorman addresses the contradiction by hypothesizing that the Court gives a "preferred position" to
"personal liberty cases"--and strikes down statutes that endanger those liberties. Gorman, supra, at
694-96. I believe this "preferred position" to be roughly synonymous with the Court's current over-
breadth doctrine. See text accompanying notes 95-181 infra. Gorman notes, however, that First
Amendment cases seem to be the only area in which the Court is generally consistent. Gorman, supra,
at 698.
11. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTri-uTIONAL LAW 1192 (12th ed. 1991) (noting that the typical
"as applied" challenge is brought by a person whose acts are protected under the Constitution).
12. I argue below that this principle is a necessary element of the American practice of judicial
review. See notes 32-54 infra and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289-91 (1924) (stating that an unobjectionable
provision can be considered severable from an invalid provision only if, standing alone, the unobjection-
able provision can have legal effect, and the legislature intended the provision to stand even if others
were invalid).
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determine a statute's validity, are inconsistent with a practice of severing inva-
lid applications of a statute. The Supreme Court's treatment of facial chal-
lenges in these three areas does not reflect a commitment to the Salerno test.
Not only does the Court inconsistently apply the broad Salerno principle, it
fails to articulate why it departs from Salerno or to justify the extent of its
departure. This article attempts to do both.
Part III considers how principles of federalism affect the resolution of facial
challenges. Because a statute's facial validity ultimately turns on statutory con-
struction, the appropriate resolution of cases involving federal and state statutes
may differ. I argue that the Court's use of the same standard for facial chal-
lenges to all state statutes conflicts with its usual approach to questions of state
law in which federal courts accommodate state-by-state variations. Part I also
addresses the question of how a federal court should treat a facial challenge to a
federal statute.
At the end of the article, I conclude that contrary to what Salerno pro-
claims, no single legal standard controls the judgment of facial challenges in
practice. Reliance on ultimately superficial distinctions between facial and as-
applied challenges to statutes only confuses the underlying concerns of substan-
tive constitutional doctrine and institutional competence that govern the resolu-
tion of each case.
I. THE SALERNO PRINCIPLE, SEvERABILrry, AND THE RULE OF LAW
A. The Salerno Principle
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Salerno announces that a facial chal-
lenge to a statute will fail if the statute has any constitutional application. 14 If
Salerno really set forth the governing standard, however, litigants would rarely
bring facial challenges. In an as-applied challenge, if the statute in question
cannot be constitutionally applied to the litigant, then she will prevail without
having to show that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute
could be constitutionally applied to someone else. On the other hand, if the
litigant loses her as-applied challenge, she will also lose her facial challenge
under Salerno because the statute is constitutional in at least one circumstance.
In short, a litigant can prevail on a facial challenge only if she can also prevail
on an as-applied challenge, and even then she may lose the facial challenge.
Under Salerno, a litigant bringing a facial rather than an as-applied challenge
gains nothing.
Moreover, the Salerno opinion cites no direct authority to support its truly
draconian standard.' 5 The Court's justification appears in the sentence follow-
14. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
15. Although not cited in Salerno, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), could be
said to support the "no set of circumstances" test. In Keyishian, the Court characterized an earlier
decision upholding two statutes against a facial challenge as merely holding that those laws "were
capable of constitutional application." l at 594. That characterization may, however, have reflected
the Court's understanding of the proper limits of jurisdiction in a suit for declaratory relief from antici-
pated harm.
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ing the announcement of the test: "The fact that the [statute] might operate
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient
to render it wholly invalid .... 16
The Salerno Court thus directs its argument at a straw man. While a statute
that "might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circum-
stances" could be facially valid, it hardly follows, as the Court implies, that a
statute with a large number of obviously unconstitutional applications should
be facially valid merely because there exists some set of circumstances, no
matter how small or insignificant, under which the statute can be applied with-
out violating a constitutional guarantee. A wide gulf separates the statute that
might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances
from one that operates unconstitutionally under all circumstances. The Court in
Salerno does not explain why its rejection of the very low threshold necessi-
tates adoption of the very high one. Yet this leap affects a broad middle range
of statutes, which are unconstitutional in a substantial number of applications
but constitutional in a substantial number of others. Under Salerno, courts
must hold this broad middle range of statutes facially valid simply because
statutes in a different category-those that potentially have unconstitutional ap-
plications in a very limited set of circumstances-are also facially valid.
Even if the "no set of circumstances" test had been the result of a carefully
reasoned analysis, Salerno was a peculiar case in which to announce the stan-
dard because the Court never applied the test in reaching its decision. In Sa-
lerno, respondents challenged the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of
1984, which authorizes a federal court to detain an indictee without bail pend-
ing trial upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that "no release
conditions 'will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the
community."" 7 The respondents argued that the Act is facially invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Bail Clause
of the Eighth Amendment. Because the state cannot confine a person not ac-
cused of a crime merely upon a showing of future dangerousness, the respon-
dents argued, and Justice Marshall echoed in his dissent, to treat indictees
differently would give evidentiary weight to the indictment and thereby under-
cut the presumption of innocence. 18 The Court disagreed, rejecting the respon-
dents' substantive and procedural due process challenges as well as their Eighth
Amendment challenge. 19
Putting aside the merits of the case,20 one finds no apparent link between
16. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
17. Id. at 741 (quoting the Bail Reform Act of 1984) (alteration in original).
18. Id. at 762-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 755.
20. As one might expect, commentators have given the result in Salerno mixed reviews. Compare
Michael W. Youtt, Note, The Effect of Salerno v. United States on the Use of State Preventive Detention
Legislation: A New Definition of Due Process, 22 GA. L. Rv. 805 (1988) (noting that Salerno's exten-
sive procedural safeguards will both protect the accused and allow the government interest in limiting
postarrest crime) and Alexia J. Johnston, Note, United States v. Salerno: Preventive Detention-Coming
of Age, 1988 Dar. C.L. REv. 135 (arguing that Salerno was a positive step toward protecting society
from criminals) with Michael J. Eason, Note, Eighth Amendment-Pretrial Detention: What Will Be-
come of the Innocent?, 78 J. CPim. L. & CRIMNOLOGy 1048 (1988) (arguing that, at some point, ex-
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the Court's opening broadside decrying the facial challenge vehicle and the
actual decision. At best, the Court throws in a rhetorical flourish to reassure the
reader: Because the suit is, after all, a facial challenge, the reader need not
worry that what is being upheld appears constitutionally questionable.
Under the "no set of circumstances" test, the government need only produce
an example in which the statute could be applied constitutionally to defeat the
facial challenge. Such an example is readily available in the Salerno context.
Since well established law allows a judge to set bail at an amount appropriate to
deter flight,21 in cases where defendants would flee regardless of how high bail
is set-such as defendants facing long sentences or capital punishment if con-
victed-a judge may deny bail altogether without running afoul of either the
Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the Bail Reform Act can
be constitutionally applied to defendants who are flight risks, regardless of
whether future dangerousness is a generally invalid criterion. Because the ap-
plication of the statute to defendants who pose a flight risk is constitutional, the
respondents fail to carry their burden of showing that there exists "no set of
circumstances" under which the Act can be constitutionally applied.
The Court's opinion does not, however, proceed along these lines. Instead,
the Court attempts to establish future dangerousness as a legitimate basis for
detaining any indictee pending trial. 22 The Court makes all the arguments nec-
essary for the denial of an as-applied challenge, first qualifying the nature of
the detainee's interest in liberty, and then extolling the government's interest in
protecting citizens against violence. Despite the Court's obligatory disclaimer
that it expresses no view on the likely success of an as-applied challenge,23
such success is difficult to imagine in light of the Court's validation of the Bail
Reform Act's central criterion for confinement.
Perhaps the Court's disclaimer means only that the Act, while facially
valid, might still be unconstitutionally applied if a court happens to violate a
tended pretrial detention becomes punitive and unconstitutional) and John B. Howard, Jr., Note, The
Trial of Pretrial Dangerousness: Preventive Detention After United States v. Salerno, 75 VA. L. REv.
639 (1989) (questioning whether Salerno will encourage lower courts to deny bail without adequately
focusing on the specific threat posed by the defendant if released before trial).
21. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
22. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747-48, 751. One portion of the Court's opinion in Salerno appears to
apply the "no set of circumstances" test by pointing to a possible constitutional application. The Court
states that "[t]o sustain [the procedures of the Act] against [a facial] challenge, we need only find them
'adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some [indictees]."' Id at 751 (quoting Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984)). Careful scrutiny of the authority cited, however, reveals that the
Court's reliance on the language in Schall is misplaced. The language in Schall precedes citations of
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975), both of
which involved claims that a procedural scheme was inconsistent with the requirements of due process;
in each case the Court used a balancing test to weigh the relative interests of the government and the
suspect. In neither case did the Court hold a set of procedures constitutional by showing that they could
legitimately authorize some deprivations of liberty. And indeed, although the Schall Court used the "at
least some" language, it actually applied a balancing approach like Mathews and Gerstein. See Schall,
467 U.S. at 274-77. Thus, when the Court in Salerno upholds the procedures of the Ball Reform Act
because "the protections are more exacting than those we found sufficient" in Schall, Salerno, 481 U.S.
at 752, it implicitly applies the same balancing test instead of applying the "no set of circumstances"
standard to the specific situation in Salerno.
23. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 n.3.
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constitutional norm while complying with the language of the Act. If, for ex-
ample, a judge were to find an indictee dangerous based in part on her race, the
finding would present an unconstitutional "application" of the Bail Reform Act.
But such an application would be unconstitutional because of the nature of the
judge's action, rather than anything in the statute, and we would more naturally
classify the judge's action as a straightforward equal protection violation. If
this is the only kind of as-applied challenge that remains open after Salerno,
then the Court has gone beyond what the "no set of circumstances" test re-
quires. The Court does not simply deem the Bail Reform Act capable of con-
stitutional application; it declares the Act virtually incapable of unconstitutional
application. Hence, Salerno ironically fails to adhere to the "no set of circum-
stances" standard it announces.
Of course, this criticism of Salerno does not, in itself, demonstrate that the
"no set of circumstances" test is wrong. The Court's failure to justify the test
does not mean that no justification exists. Salerno may have simply been an
easy case in which the facial challenge would have failed even if the Court had
applied a less demanding standard. Can we justify the Salerno standard when a
case's outcome depends on the standard? My evaluation of this question
hinges on whether individuals have a right to be judged by a constitutionally
valid rule of law. If such a right exists, as I demonstrate in the next Part, the
Salerno principle requires that a statute's unconstitutional applications be sev-
erable from its constitutional ones. I explore the implications of this conclusion
in Parts II and II.
B. The Right to Be Judged by a Constitutionally Valid Law
The logic behind the Salerno principle contradicts the principle that Henry
Monaghan has articulated: "[A] litigant has always had the right to be judged
in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law."'24 An early precursor
of Salerno illustrates this contradiction.
In 1912, the Court in Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co.25 rejected a facial challenge to a statute because that statute had some con-
stitutional applications. In that case, the Yazoo Railroad challenged a Missis-
sippi statute that required railroads to settle all claims for lost or damaged
goods promptly. The Railroad argued that the statute should be held invalid
because it would apply even when claims were fraudulent or frivolous. 26 The
particular claim at issue, however, was neither fraudulent nor frivolous, and the
Court refused to consider the Railroad's facial challenge, treating it entirely as
an as-applied challenge. 27 As the Court put it: "It suffices ... to hold that, as
24. Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 3. Monaghan, aware of this
tension, constructs his approach to overbreadth as a means of addressing it. See id. at 4-14.
25. 226 U.S. 217 (1912).
26. Id. at 219.
27. See also United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) ("[Olne to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that... applying [it] to
other persons or other situations ... might be unconstitutional."); Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474,
508-09 (1913) ("The acts are valid upon their face as a proper exercise of governmental authority in the
establishment of reasonable rates, and each complainant in order to succeed in assailing them must show
[Vol. 46:235
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applied to cases like the present, the statute is valid. ' 28
Although not inherently contradictory, the result in Yazoo does seem con-
trary to the right to be judged by a valid rule of law. If the statute requiring
railroads to settle all claims promptly is an unconstitutional exercise of the
state's authority, then, one would suppose, no railroad should be judged by it,
even if the railroad's conduct merits no constitutional protection.
Monaghan attempts to demonstrate this point by asking us to assume that
people have a constitutional right to dance in a barroom unless the dancer is
barefoot. Suppose a state statute prohibits all barroom dancing, regardless of
whether the dancer wears shoes. According to Monaghan, convicting even a
barefoot dancer under the statute is clearly unconstitutional, although he fails to
explain why.29 In similarly conclusory fashion, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., asserts
that "[t]he due process clause or, more generally, the rule of law" entitles liti-
gants to challenge laws that are "unconstitutional as applied to someone
else."3 0
While I agree with Monaghan and Fallon that the United States Constitu-
tion permits only the application of constitutional rules, this conclusion is by no
means self-evident. 31 Examining possible justifications for this entitlement
that as to it the rates are confiscatory."); Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1905) (accepting the
state supreme court's holding that the statute constitutionally proscribed the defendant's conduct, irre-
spective of whether the statute's language could also be construed to proscribe conduct beyond the
state's control).
28. Yazoo, 226 U.S. at 219-20.
29. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 910. The apparent source for Monaghan's hypothetical is
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 9 n.33. As I
argue below, see text accompanying notes 46-54 infra, Monaghan correctly concludes that a litigant has
a right not to be judged by an unconstitutional rule of law, although Thompson itself falls to provide
support for that conclusion. In Thompson, the Court did not actually invalidate the ordinance. Rather,
the Court held that the conviction violated due process because there was no evidence of the defendant's
guilt. Thompson, 362 U.S. at 206.
30. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE LJ. 853, 862 (1991); see
also LAuRENcE H. TRm, AMERICAN CONSTTUTONAL LAw § 1227, at 1023-24 (2d ed. 1988); Note,
The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Ry. 844, 848 (1970) (stating that an over-
breadth claim is not "ineluctably vicarious" because the claimant "is asserting his own right not to be
burdened by an unconstitutional rule of law").
31. Monaghan's barroom dancing example poses but falls to answer the question whether there is
a right to be judged by a valid rule of law. In a more recent article, he gives a more realistic but no less
conclusory example. Beginning from the premise that a statute prohibiting "whistling in any building"
would be unconstitutional because irrational, he contends that such a statute could not be applied even to
one who disrupts a judicial proceeding by whistling in a courtroom. Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless
Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. 195, 196.
Likewise, none of the cases Monaghan cites stands for the proposition that there is a right to be
judged by a valid rule. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 9 n.34. Two of the cases he cites focus on the
evidentiary concerns that arise when a statute prohibits both constitutionally protected and unprotected
conduct. See Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1970) (overturning the conviction of dem-
onstrators against the Vietnam War because there was no way of knowing whether the jury based its
decision on constitutional or unconstitutional grounds); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292
(1942) (overturning a bigamy conviction because the jury could have decided on the basis of either of
two laws, only one of which was constitutional). Similar reasoning explains the holding in Ulster
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 159-60 (1979), that, when a defendant challenges the use of a
mandatory presumption, the sufficiency of the evidence is irrelevant, as a mandatory presumption is
unconstitutional precisely because it may lead a jury to ignore the evidence. As I note in the text
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provides a better understanding of its consequences in the context of a facial
challenge.
1. Evidentiary considerations.
In many Supreme Court cases, the evidence considered at trial requires the
Court to judge a statute on its face rather than as applied. Consider again
Monaghan's barroom dancing example. If the statute prohibits all barroom
dancing, a jury could find that a dancer violated the statute without maling a
factual determination as to whether the dancer was barefoot. Assuming a con-
stitutional right to dance in a barroom, however, an appellate court cannot sus-
tain such a conviction under the statute because there is no jury finding on this
crucial question.32 Furthermore, in both criminal and civil cases, courts cannot
sustain verdicts that may rest on constitutionally impermissible grounds.
These evidentiary considerations partially establish the right to be judged
by a constitutionally valid law, but do not entirely justify the right. Suppose a
jury returned a special verdict making clear that the barroom dancer was bare-
foot. Is it still impermissible to judge her under a law that is unconstitutional in
other respects? Perhaps it is, but not because of evidentiary considerations.
Before examining additional factors supporting a right to be judged by a consti-
tutionally valid rule of law, it is helpful to consider the ramifications of an
opposite rule.
2. A privileged-conduct-only rule.
Imagine a democratic and rights-respecting polity that allows litigants to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if it burdens their own constitu-
tionally protected conduct-what I shall refer to as a "privileged-conduct-only
accompanying note 32 infra, these concerns, although important, do not entirely establish a right to be
judged by a valid rule of law.
Another of the cases Monaghan cites, Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S.
160, 169-70 (1894), involves a violation of what we would now call procedural due process. But a
party who contends that a procedure is so unfair as to deny due process does not need to demonstrate a
constitutional right to the underlying entitlement or privilege. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262-63 (1970) (holding that public assistance payments cannot be terminated without a hearing,
even though the benefits are not a constitutional right).
In the remaining cases Monaghan cites, the Court grants relief to a party whose own conduct is not
constitutionally privileged because, as a matter of statutory construction, it finds that the invalid applica-
tions of the statute are not severable from the valid ones. See New York Cent. R.R v. White, 243 U.S.
188, 197 (1917) (noting that had a worker's compensation scheme been invalid as applied to employees,
it could not have been applied to employers either); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514,
528-30 (1906) (holding that the Secretary of Agriculture cannot draw a quarantine line that regulates not
only interstate but also intrastate commerce); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 262 (1905) (stating
that a statute "must be valid as to all that it embraces, or altogether void. An exception of a class of
constitutionally exempted cannot be read into those general words merely for the purpose of saving what
remains"); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1879) (invalidating a statute regulating the use of
trademarks because it was beyond the authority of Congress). As I argue throughout this article, sever-
ability considerations are critical to understanding facial challenges, but they involve statutory ques-
tions; they do not establish a constitutional right to be judged by a valid rule of law.
In sum, Monaghan offers no argument or authority for a general right to be judged by a valid rule of
32. Bachellar, 397 U.S. at 569-71; Williams, 317 U.S. at 292.
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rule." The polity might view such a rule as a kind of standing requirement,
analogous to the requirements litigants claiming rights under a treaty or the
Fourth Amendment must meet.
Generally, a court will not hold that a treaty between nations confers rights
enforceable by individual citizens absent a clear manifestation of the signato-
ries' intent to do so. 33 Instead, courts presume that a treaty creates rights and
obligations enforceable only between the signatory nations, and individuals
lack the third-party or derivative standing to assert the treaty rights.34 Whether
right or wrong,35 limiting the justiciability of treaty provisions presumably
serves a separation of powers objective. Because treaties are primarily the do-
main of the political branches, especially the Executive, courts will enforce a
treaty only when the treaty's own terms require them to do so.
The Supreme Court has likewise restricted Fourth Amendment standing,
holding that a criminal defendant may not exclude illegally obtained evidence
from her trial unless the illegal search or seizure violated her own Fourth
Amendment rights.36 Because the Court considers Fourth Amendment rights
"personal rights," third parties cannot assert them.37
One could defend a privileged-conduct-only rule for statutes as structurally
identical to the standing requirements for litigants claiming Fourth Amendment
or treaty rights. The courts may not punish an illegal search of A by sup-
pressing illegally obtained evidence at the trial of B. Nor may the courts en-
force a treaty provision designed to benefit nation C by permitting individual D
to raise it in litigation that does not involve C. So, one might argue, the courts
may not invalidate a statute which infringes E's constitutional rights by refus-
ing to apply it to F.
A privileged-conduct-only rule restricting constitutional challenges to cases
that implicate the litigant's own personal rights serves two institutional pur-
poses.38 First, as with treaties, it reduces the room for judicial interference with
the other branches of government. Of course, any restriction on judicial power
33. See, e.g., Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that individuals
cannot enforce rights under the United Nations Charter).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (1992) (noting that an
individual's rights under a United States-Mexico treaty are derivative of her nation's rights).
35. Although not illogical, the Court's approach to treaty interpretation seems inconsistent with
the literal text of the Supremacy Clause ("[A]II Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."). U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cI. 2. See Carlos Manuel Viz-
quez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082 (1992) (arguing that
the Framers declared treaties to be the supreme law of the land so that individuals would have the power
to enforce their provisions in domestic courts).
36. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (refusing to allow defendants to exclude
illegally obtained evidence because the search had not violated the defendants' own rights).
37. l at 133-34 ("'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which... may not be vicari-
ously asserted."') (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). Admittedly, sup-
pressing evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment serves a deterrent function regardless
of whose rights the search or seizure violated. But the exclusionary rule also carries the costs of under-
enforcement of criminal laws. Accordingly, the Court's limitations on Fourth Amendment standing may
represent a determination that these costs outweigh the benefits of a broader definition of justiciability.
38. For a similar analysis of the justifications underlying justiciability doctrine, see Lea Brilmayer,
The Jurisprudence of Article Iff: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HAgv. L.
REv. 297, 302-06 (1979).
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has this effect. But the argument for judicial restraint has greatest force when
allowing the other branches free rein is unlikely to result in a diminution of
individual liberty. And, by hypothesis, no decrease in individual liberty results
when a litigant concedes that her own behavior is not constitutionally
privileged.
Second, the privileged-conduct-only principle confines judicial decision-
making to real, as opposed to hypothetical, cases. Assuming that courts func-
tion best when presented with concrete rather than abstract controversies, the
principle reduces the risk of erroneous decisions. I shall refer to these two
points in favor of a privileged-conduct-only rule as the interest in legislative
supremacy and the interest in concrete decisionmaking, respectively.
3. Marbury v. Madison and the right to be judged by a constitutionally
valid rule of law.
While the interests in legislative supremacy and concrete decisionmaking
merit consideration, requiring a litigant to establish that her conduct is constitu-
tionally privileged before allowing her to challenge a statute fundamentally
conflicts with the theory of judicial review underlying Marbury v. Madison.3 9
Consider first the principle of legislative supremacy. The substantive ques-
tion Marbury addresses-whether Congress may expand the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court beyond the categories enumerated in Article Ill-
might be termed a structural question of constitutional law. The provision does
not directly bear on individual rights. Indeed, the party invoking the Constitu-
tion did not even claim an individual right. Only William Marbury, who as-
serted a right to his commission as a justice of the peace, made an individual
claim. Yet the Court permitted Madison to invoke the Constitution to defeat
Marbury's admittedly valid, albeit subconstitutional, claim.40
One could argue that, although Madison invoked no individual right,41 the
ultimate purpose of the Constitution's structural provisions is the preservation
of individual liberty.42 While this argument has great force, it hardly supports
a rule requiring every litigant to demonstrate a threat to her own constitutional
rights. Structural provisions may, in the long run, preserve individual liberty,
but they do not inevitably do so in every case. As in Marbury, a litigant could
39. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For an argument that Marbury is inconsistent with as-applied
challenges, see Note, supra note 30, at 850-51. By implication, the same is true of challenges to state
laws. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810).
40. For the canonical critique of Marbury, see William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Dura L.J. 1. I use the term "subconstitutional" to describe rules of law that
are not required by the Constitution.
41. As a representative of the federal government, Madison, in some sense, invoked the "individ-
ual" rights of the government. I am using the term "individual rights" to refer to privileges of individual
natural persons to engage in various courses of conduct, but this may be somewhat inconsistent with the
term's use in Marbury. When, for example, the Court explains that its role is "to decide on the rights of
individuals," Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170, it employs the phrase to indicate the interests of particular liti-
gants, as opposed to more general matters.
42. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty .... ").
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claim a right to a writ of mandamus in order to force a government official to
stop violating his rights. Alternatively, a litigant could sue for a writ of manda-
mus to compel a government official to take a course of action that infringes
someone else's liberty. Therefore, a judgment that Article M's exhaustiveness
regarding the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is justiciable cannot rest
solely on the assumption that a contrary decision would result in a diminution
of individual liberty.
Perhaps the second putative justification for the privileged-conduct-only
rule, the interest in concrete decisionmaking, offers a more compelling reason.
No doubt this interest is important; in fact, Article III requires an actual case or
controversy as a prerequisite to adjudication in the federal courts. But does the
interest in concrete decisionmaking justify something more? To return to
Monaghan's example, when a criminal defendant challenges the prohibition on
all barroom dancing, she presents a real issue in terms of the Article Im limits
on justiciability. The statute's validity determines whether she goes to
prison.43 Thus, the interest in concrete decisionmaking supports a privileged-
conduct-only rule, but solely as a prudential or subconstitutional matter.
Prudential considerations cannot, of course, trump constitutional ones.44
To the extent that the prudential arguments for a privileged-conduct-only rule
conflict with constitutional principles, the former must yield. As an examina-
tion of Marbury illustrates, the constitutional principle of judicial review is
inconsistent with a privileged-conduct-only rule.
The general concept of the rule of law does not lead directly to the principle
that a litigant has a right to be judged by a constitutionally valid rule, as
Monaghan and Fallon appear to believe;45 rather, the principle is a collateral
consequence of Marbury's specific concept of the rule of law. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury frames the ultimate question as follows: "If an
act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwith-
standing its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?" 46
Throughout his opinion, Marshall focuses on the question whether the statute is
consistent with the Constitution. And he concludes that "a law repugnant to the
constitution is void."47 Under this view, now canonized in American law, the
very meaning of an enforceable constitution is that an unconstitutional law may
not be enforced.48 As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 78, antici-
43. See Note, supra note 30, at 848.
44. Cf Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1,
36 (1959) (arguing that the Supreme Court has an unflagging obligation to exercise its authority to
adjudicate constitutional questions).
45. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
46. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added).
47. I at 180 (emphasis added).
48. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886), sets forth an extreme version of this basic
postulate: "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed." Id. at 442. A more moderate view posits that a judgment of unconstitutionality binds only in a
judicial setting, leaving the "invalidated" statute on the books. See GuNrTHa, supra note 11, at 28
(explaining how the decision that a law is unconstitutional might merely suspend its enforcement until a
later court reverses the decision); TamF, supra note 30, § 3-3, at 27-28 (describing the view that judicial
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pating Marbury:
A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the mean-
ing of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should
happen to be an irreconcileable [sic] variance between the two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other
words, the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute .... 49
4. The Supremacy Clause and the Constitution.
Apart from Marbury, the Constitution itself directs courts to focus on the
constitutionality of a challenged statute rather than on the privileged or un-
privileged character of the conduct of the litigant challenging it. The
Supremacy Clause declares that the Constitution is supreme, "any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 50 Logi-
cally read, a "Thing" refers to a provision of law, not an application of that
provision to privileged conduct. 51 Applications, after all, arise not "in" laws,
but, by definition, from applying them.52 Thus, the First Amendment pros-
cribes the making of any "law" establishing religion or violating the freedom of
speech, the press, or assembly. A law which does so is unconstitutional.
The Constitution does not create, in so many words, an individual right to
be judged only by a constitutional law. But the Constitution certainly forbids a
court from enforcing an unconstitutional law.5 3 Courts, which will not enforce
pronouncement of unconstitutionality binds only the parties before the court). Still, even this narrower
reading of Marbury acknowledges that-barring a reinterpretation of the statute or an overruling of the
case invalidating it-so far as the judiciary is concerned, a statute that has been judged unconstitutional
is no law at all, even if it remains visible to other government actors.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
50. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
51. The clause applies by analogy to federal as well as state law.
52. 1 do not wish to suggest that an application of a facially valid law cannot be unconstitutional.
It can, as for example, when the government enforces the law unevenly. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). But the Supremacy Clause directs itself primarily at unconstitutional laws;
only derivatively does it prevent unconstitutional applications of constitutional laws.
53. The theory of judicial review underlying Marbury by no means limits itself to the United
States Supreme Court. By its terms, the Supremacy Clause, the ultimate source of judicial authority to
give the Constitution priority over contradictory statutes, applies to state judges. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cL
2. And, of course, Congress has empowered lower federal courts to adjudicate constitutional questions
as well. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (conferring original jurisdiction on district courts in civil
actions arising under the Constitution).
Whether executive officials are forbidden from enforcing laws they deem unconstitutional presents a
more difficult question. The President's oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution," U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8, implies such a prohibition, but serious separation of powers issues could arise if
the executive attempted to nullify putatively unconstitutional legislation except through the veto power
or perhaps the pardon power. See generally TRIE, supra note 30, § 4-12, at 256-62 (discussing legisla-
tive attempts to restrict executive power to impound congressionally appropriated funds). And in the
administrative law realm, agency discretion limits the ability of so-called "enforcement courts" to give
effect to constitutional imperatives. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
CoLuM. L. Rav. 1, 28-34 (1983) (arguing that administrative agency discretion effectively deprives
courts of constitutional rulemaking authority); cf Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 H/v. L. REv. 1362, 1377-78 (1953)
(recognizing administrative agency discretion but emphasizing that agencies are not making "fmal deter-
minations of questions of law").
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unconstitutional laws, will treat litigants exactly as though they have a right to
be judged only by constitutional rule of laws. In practice, therefore, every liti-
gant does have such a right.54
C. Severability Doctrine
If the principle that every litigant has a right to be judged by a constitution-
ally valid law follows naturally from Marbury and other constitutional
precepts, how could the Court adopt a seemingly contrary principle in Yazoo
and Salerno? The answer lies in severability doctrine.
To understand the relation between the Yazoo/Salerno holding and'sever-
ability doctrine, consider once again Monaghan's barroom dancing example.
Recall our assumptions: (1) people have a constitutional right to dance in a
barroom unless one is barefoot; and (2) a state statute prohibits all barroom
dancing. Clearly, the statute is unconstitutional because the state may not for-
bid barroom dancing by persons who are not barefoot. If the state prosecutes
Mr. Thompson for dancing barefoot in a barroom, must he go free?
The answer depends on whether the court treats the unconstitutional appli-
cations of the statute as severable from the constitutional ones. Suppose that
the highest court of the state holds the statute unconstitutional as applied to
persons who are not barefoot. That does not necessarily mean that the entire
law must fall. The court might void the statute to the extent it criminalizes
nonbarefooted dancing, but sever the remainder as valid-in essence, rewriting
the statute. Prior to the court's ruling, the law read: "Barroom dancing shall be
an offense." By ruling that the statute's unconstitutional applications are sever-
able, the court essentially holds that the law has two parts. The first reads:
"Barroom dancing shall be an offense if the dancer is not barefoot." The sec-
ond reads: "Barroom dancing shall be an offense if the dancer is barefoot."
Under this analysis, the second part of the statute stands on its own as a consti-
tutionally valid law. Thus, the court would sustain Mr. Thompson's conviction
under the statute because he is being judged by a valid rule-the newly severed
second part of the statute.
Of course, the state court need not declare the first part of the statute invalid
in order to sustain Mr. Thompson's conviction. Rather, it suffices to note that
if the statute has unconstitutional applications, they are severable from the con-
stitutional applications. The court need not decide whether the statute would be
unconstitutional as applied to persons not before it.
The opinion in Yazoo takes precisely this form. Recall the railroad's argu-
ment: The Mississippi statute mandating fines for failure to settle claims was
unconstitutional because it would require settlement of fraudulent and frivolous
54. Although refusals to give retroactive effect to a constitutional decision seemingly conflict with
the valid rule requirement, they may be harmonized. For instance, one could interpret the Court's "new
rule" of law nonretroactivity doctrine for habeas petitions, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)
(plurality opinion), as an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (procedure for habeas petition), rather than
the Constitution. But even recognizing nonretroactivity as an exception to the general requirement of a
valid rule, the very controversy purely prospective rulings generate, see, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling
Co. v. Georgia, II S. CL 2439 (1991), indicates the strength of the general requirement.
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claims. The Court, however, refused to rule on the constitutionality of the stat-
ute because the railroad did not contend that the claims the statute required
them to settle were fraudulent or frivolous. Severability analysis reconciles
Yazoo with the principle that every litigant has a right to be judged by a consti-
tutionally valid law. Although the Court did not address severability in deny-
ing relief, it effectively presumed that, under Mississippi law, the state courts
would sever any unconstitutional applications of the statute from the constitu-
tional ones. Thus, the decision in Yazoo established a presumption that a stat-
ute's constitutional and unconstitutional applications are severable.55
The severability presumption also explains the Salerno formulation. If we
assume that the courts can sever the Bail Reform Act's unconstitutional appli-
cations from its constitutional applications, then one can only mount a success-
ful facial challenge to the Act by showing that no set of circumstances exist
under which it can be constitutionally applied. For, if the Act has any constitu-
tional applications, a court should construe them as a separate, constitutional
Act. Conversely, if a statute has no constitutional applications, then no statute
remains after a court severs the unconstitutional applications.
Indeed, the Court applied the same presumption of severability in Marbury.
In so doing, it showed how this presumption limits the principle that a litigant
has a right to be judged under a constitutionally valid law. Despite the Mar-
bury Court's statement that "an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitu-
tion, is void,"56 it did not hold the Judiciary Act of 1789 void in its entirety.
Instead, the Court apparently assumed that it could treat so much of the Act as
authorized it to grant writs of mandamus without an additional basis for origi-
nal Supreme Court jurisdiction as if it were a distinct unconstitutional provi-
sion. In other words, the Court implicitly held that the invalid provision was
severable. 57
55. See PAUL M. BATOR, DANmL J. MELTZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPimo, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouETS AND aE FEDERAL SYSTEM 178-81 (3d ed. 1988).
56. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)..
57. Even if no one had a right to be judged by a constitutionally valid law, ordinary principles of
statutory construction and constitutional law would still often require courts to look beyond a litigant's
own conduct in deciding whether to enforce a statute against her. Consider Monaghan's barroom danc-
ing example one last time. When the state charges Mr. Thompson under the no-barroom-dancing-under-
any-circumstances statute, he may no longer claim that the prosecution violates a valid rule requirement
because we have assumed, arguendo, that no such right exists. However, he still has a potent defense.
He may argue that, as a matter of state statutory construction, the court may not sever unconstitutional
applications of the statute from its application to him. Thus, he may claim, the state seeks to prosecute
him under an essentially nonexistent law-nonexistent because under state severability law, the entire
statute is void. Whether Mr. Thompson prevails depends on exactly the same question that determines
his success when we recognize a valid rule requirement: whether the statute's applications are
severable.
Moreover, the absence of a valid rule requirement would not frustrate the ability of a litigant whose
own conduct is not constitutionally protected to bring a facial challenge to a state statute in federal court.
As a unanimous Court recognized in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1 (1983), it is "well-settled" that a case arises under federal law for purposes of original jurisdiction
in the federal district courts, "where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on
some construction of federal law." Id. at 9. While "this statement must be read with caution," Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 (1986), even under a restrictive view of original
federal jurisdiction, a typical facial challenge would qualify as one in which federal law is "in the
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Courts cannot reduce every facial challenge to a severability question. As a
doctrine of statutory construction, severability must defer to constitutional prin-
ciples. In Part II of this article, I argue that, in many circumstances, overriding
constitutional considerations trump severability doctrine. When they do not,
however, facial challenge doctrine really boils down to severability doctrine
combined with institutional limits on the Salerno presumption of severability,
which I discuss in Part III.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO THE YAZOo/SALERNO PRESUMPTION
OF SEVERABILITY
Despite the apparent universality of the Court's pronouncement in Salerno,
the presumption of severability does not apply in all contexts. Two limitations
presently constrain the presumption's reach, one institutional and one substan-
tive. I discuss the institutional restraints-the choice of forum and the source
of the statute-and their implications in Part I. This Part addresses those
limits to the presumption of severability that arise out of substantive constitu-
tional law. The Court's treatment of underinclusive statutes in equal protection
challenges implicitly rejects a Salerno-type approach. Furthermore, Salerno is
inappropriate not just for First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, as the Court
has acknowledged, but also for applications of overbreadth doctrine to funda-
mental rights outside of the First Amendment area. Finally, constitutional tests
which turn on a statute's purpose rather than its application are inconsistent
with a presumption of severability.
A. Underinclusive Statutes and the Equal Protection Clause
The Salerno presumption requires a court to focus only on the conduct of
the parties before it, rather than on the conduct of third parties. Yet, by their
terms, some constitutional provisions compel courts to compare the relative
burdens on different actors. The Equal Protection Clause provides a prime ex-
ample, and indeed, the Court has not applied the presumption of severability to
equal protection cases involving underinclusive statutes. This may be due to
the complexity inherent in deciding how to "sever" an underinclusive statute.
Do courts expand its coverage--"sever" the exclusion of certain groups by in-
cluding them-or nullify it-sever the "singling out" of those covered by the
law?
To illustrate, suppose a state statute reads: "Littering shall be an offense if
committed by African-Americans but not if committed by persons of other
races." The statute is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment be-
forefront of the case and not collateral, peripheral or remote." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frank-fter, J., dissenting).
Finally, the same argument applies to facial challenges to federal statutes. Whether the invalid
applications of a federal statute are severable from its constitutional applications presents a question of
federal statutory construction. Unconstitutional provisions of a nonseverable federal statute render it
wholly unenforceable regardless of whether a right to be judged by a valid law exists.
In short, even if one rejects my Marbury-based argument for the valid rule requirement, severability
principles still hold the key to understanding what is at stake when a litigant brings a facial challenge.
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cause it denies African-Americans equal treatment on account of their race.
Suppose a litigant challenges the statute on its face. How might a court sever
the unconstitutional applications from the constitutional ones? One answer
consistent with Yazoo and Salerno is that such a task is impossible: the statute
has no constitutional applications; by its terms, it does not apply to persons who
are not African-Americans. Thus, if we try to sever the unconstitutional appli-
cation to African-Americans, the remaining statute reads: "Littering shall be an
offense if committed by African-Americans but not if committed by persons of
other races, except that this statute shall not apply to African-Americans." We
are left with a statute that prohibits nothing. This example illustrates the un-
controversial portion of the Salerno principle: A sufficient condition for a stat-
ute's facial invalidity is that it admits of no constitutional applications.
Consider instead an alternative approach. Our original statute reads: "(1)
Littering shall be an offense (2) if committed by African-Americans but not if
committed by persons of other races." If we "sever" the second portion of the
statute, the resulting statute is plainly constitutional. The statute now prohibits
littering, regardless of the litterer's race.
Although this second method of severance may seem somewhat odd, it
more closely addresses the constitutional problem than does the first. The vice
of the original statute lies in that it applies only to African-Americans, and is
thus underinclusive. It should not be surprising that judges will not satisfacto-
rily cure underinclusiveness by making a statute less inclusive. Instead, the
more obvious method of saving an underinclusive statute is to make it more
inclusive.
Severance by expansion comes closer to conventional severance than sever-
ance by nullification. In severing unconstitutional portions of a statute one
seeks to preserve as much of the statute as possible. Thus, broadening the
statute accomplishes this goal,58 whereas whittling the statute down to nothing
does not. Severance by nullification kills the patient along with the disease.
Nothing in the Equal Protection Clause59 prevents courts from curing an
underinclusive statute by expanding its coverage.60 Although there may be rea-
sons to prefer expanding a provision's scope to eliminating it, such decisions
are based on principles of statutory interpretation, not constitutional law.
6 1
58. Indeed, one might argue that more of the statute is "preserved" than the legislature enacted.
59. As a matter of statutory construction, one might reasonably object to adding provisions to cure
a statute's constitutional flaws because it borders on judicial legislation and is at odds with the view that
judges should give statutes the meaning their text supports. But the objection applies with equal force to
the practice of severing an unconstitutional application by reading in an exception. In short, the argu-
ment against creatively construing a statute to cure a constitutional defect or avoid a constitutional
question, however persuasive, presents a general objection. It holds no greater or lesser force in equal
protection cases.
60. One commentator has noted: "Where a statute denies equal protection by making an unconsti-
tutional classification, the classification can be abolished by making the statute operate either on every-
one or on no one." Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1136 (1969).
61. The Court has, for example, tended to remedy underinclusive federal benefit statutes by ex-
panding the class of beneficiaries. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1979) (gender discrim-
ination in welfare benefits); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637-38 (1974) (disability benefits for
illegitimate children of disabled parents); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 & n.25 (1973)
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Thus, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,62 after ruling unconstitutional
an Oklahoma law that authorized the sterilization of habitual offenders but ex-
empted crimes such as embezzlement, the Supreme Court remanded the case
and let the Oklahoma courts decide whether to void the sterilization provision
or to extend it.63
Skinner illustrates that courts do not apply the Salerno presumption of sev-
erability in the context of underinclusiveness equal protection cases. Recall
that in an underinclusiveness challenge, a determination that the discriminatory
portion of the statute is severable means that courts will expand the statute's
coverage. In Skinner, had the Court employed the Salerno presumption, it
would have assumed that the discriminatory portion of the statute could be
severed and remedied any constitutional defect by expanding the statute's cov-
erage beyond the classified group. Consequently, the Court would have denied
Skinner relief because the presumptive remedy-extending the statute to all
habitual offenders-would not have benefitted him. In fact, the opposite hap-
pened: On remand, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the sterilization provi-
sion void in its entirety, with the result that Skinner avoided sterilization.6a
1. Contrasting Orr v. Orr with the Salerno presumption.
As Skinner illustrates, in deciding equal protection challenges to underin-
clusive statutes, the Court's approach differs from what the Salerno presump-
tion would suggest. In fact, in another equal protection case, Orr v. Orr,65 the
Court came close to adopting the opposite presumption. In Orr, an Alabama
man defending a charge of contempt of court for failure to pay alimony under
an Alabama statute argued that he should not have to pay alimony to his ex-
wife because the statute violated equal protection by permitting alimony awards
against men but not women. Mrs. Orr argued that the court should not permit
Mr. Orr to make this argument because he had not actually sought alimony. In
her view, he impermissibly sought to invoke the equal protection rights of a
party not before the court. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and
stated:
In every equal protection attack upon a statute challenged as underinclusive,
the State may satisfy the Constitution's commands either by extending benefits
to the previously disfavored class or by denying benefits to both parties ....
Because we have no way of knowing how the State will in fact respond, unless
we are to hold that underinclusive statutes can never be challenged because any
plaintiff's success can theoretically be thwarted, Mr. Orr must be held to have
(plurality opinion) (dependency allowance for husbands of armed forces members). But the remedy
clearly does not rise to a constitutional level: In cases involving state benefit statutes, the Court typi-
cally remands the remedial question to the state courts. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 153 (1980) (refusing to decide whether to expand or nullify a state workers' compensation
program).
62. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63. Id. at 543.
64. Skinner v. State ex reL Williamson, 195 Okla. 106, 106-07, 155 P.2d 715, 716 (1945).
65. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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standing here.66
Thus, at least for justiciability purposes, in Orr the Court presumes non-
severability, presenting a clear contrast with the Salerno approach. Moreover,
Orr is hardly aberrational. The Supreme Court has applied similar logic to
underinclusive statutes challenged under other constitutional provisions that
mandate equal treatment, such as the guarantee of free speech67 and the prohi-
bition against the establishment of religion.68
The Orr approach allows adjudication of the merits of an underinclusive-
ness challenge, regardless of whether a successful challenge would render the
litigant eligible for relief. In this respect, Orr avoids the draconian effect of
Salerno, denying relief to a litigant bringing a facial challenge to a statute
which has both constitutional and unconstitutional applications. Orr does not
require that a litigant who brings an equal protection challenge to an underin-
clusive statute be granted relief. It only requires that the constitutional question
be decided, leaving open the possibility that the court will deny the challenger
relief after she prevails on her constitutional claim.
There is one sense in which Orr departs from established practice. Ordina-
rily when a litigant seeks relief from an alleged constitutional violation, courts
may opt to avoid deciding the constitutional question if independent grounds
exist to deny the litigant relief. 69 Thus, in a case like Orr, we would expect the
court to decide the remedy question first, and reach the equal protection ques-
tion only if it finds that the remedy for such a violation would benefit the
challenger. This course would comport with the principle of constitutional
avoidance-that courts should refrain from unnecessarily deciding constitu-
tional matters.
The Court followed the opposite course in Orr purportedly because it had
"no way of knowing" how the Alabama courts would remedy the alimony stat-
ute's underinclusiveness. 70 Its reasoning, however, is disingenuous: In decid-
ing federal questions, federal courts often make preliminary determinations of
state law.71 The fact that a state's highest court may overrule a federal court's
66. Id. at 272 (emphasis in original).
67. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1987) (denying standing to
plaintiff "would effectively insulate underinclusive statutes from constitutional challenge").
68. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing Orr and
Arkansas Writers' Project as the basis for granting standing to plaintiff to challenge state's tax exemp-
tion for religious periodicals). The principle that the Establishment Clause contains a miniature equal
protection requirement is not undermined by Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), in which the
Court held as facially invalid Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in Public School Instruction Act." In that case, the Court held that although the Act purported
to be neutral, its real purpose was "to give preference to those religious groups which have as one of
their tenets the creation of humankind by a divine creator." Id. at 593. Thus, the Court's holding fits
comfortably with what Justice Harlan termed the "neutrality" norm of the Establishment Clause requir-
ing that the government neither favor religion over nonreligion nor sponsor a particular sect. Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989) (defendant barred from mounting
Equal Protection Clause claim because of nonretroactivity principle).
70. 440 U.S. at 272.
71. For example, while federal law governs whether a litigant received adequate procedural due
process, state law determines whether a particular entitlement can be considered property in the first
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resolution of a state law question means only that the federal court cannot know
with certainty how the state courts would remedy an underinclusiveness prob-
lem. In fact, if state law clearly dictates that underinclusiveness be cured by
expansion, rendering a successful challenger ineligible for relief, a federal court
could avoid deciding the difficult constitutional question by dismissing the
claim on that basis.
Moreover, the Court's statement in Orr that "any plaintiffs success can
theoretically be thwarted" by a remedy of expanded coverage72 misses a central
point. In order to thwart her husband's potential remedy, Mrs. Orr did not need
the Court to apply an irrebuttable presumption that all underinclusive Alabama
statutes will be remedied by expansion; she only needed to show that expansion
would remedy this particular Alabama statute. In other cases, litigants may
show that not applying the statute to anyone is the only remedy for that stat-
ute's underinclusiveness.
Federalism may explain the practice adopted in Orr. The decision reflects a
judgment that the risk of incorrectly guessing that a state will choose a remedy
that does not benefit the statute's challenger outweighs the harm of unnecessa-
rily deciding a constitutional question. In addition, the countervailing policy of
avoiding unnecessary decisions of state law supports the Orr approach.73
Thus, one might read the rule of Orr as representing a triumph of institutional
concerns over the severability principle.
Nevertheless, courts do not uniformly recognize federalism as the true basis
for Orr. If federalism concerns did in fact drive the Orr policy of permitting
one who may not benefit from the ultimate remedy to bring an equal protection
challenge, we would expect to see a different approach when the court deciding
the equal protection claim also has final authority over the remedy. For in-
stance, when a litigant challenges a state law on underinclusiveness grounds in
state court, the court could decide that broadening the statute's scope is the
appropriate remedy under state law and that it need not reach the federal consti-
tutional question. In finding a statute underinclusive, the state's highest court,
by definition, cannot "guess incorrectly" as to the appropriate remedy under
state law. Moreover, no principle constrains state courts from deciding ques-
tions of state law. Similar principles should apply when litigants challenge
underinclusive federal statutes in federal court.74 In a case involving a chal-
lenge to a federal statute, a federal court would not risk denying relief to an
place. Thus, in deciding whether a state violated a litigant's right to procedural due process, a federal
court will often need to decide first whether state law recognizes the interest in question as "property."
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985) (determining first that
plaintiffs possessed state property rights in continued employment before deciding whether termination
procedures met federal due process requirements). See generally BATOR Er AL., supra note 55, at 575-
80 (discussing the extent to which state law controls in due process challenges).
72. 440 U.S. at 272.
73. See, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965). See generally Martha A. Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. Rnv.
1071 (1974).
74. Although the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the
federal government, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "incorporates" an equal protection
component that is applicable to the federal government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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otherwise worthy claimant if it were to determine the remedial question before
reaching the constitutional one.
Despite Orr's apparent basis in federalism, the Court has not treated under-
inclusiveness challenges to federal statutes differently from such challenges to
state statutes. Even then-Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Orr on other
grounds, accepted a line of cases holding that the Court may decide the merits
of a case, even if Congress is "capable of frustrating a victory" by choosing a
remedy which does not benefit the litigant before the Court.75
Similarly, state courts apply the Orr method to underinclusiveness chal-
lenges to state statutes. In People v. Liberta,76 for example, the highest court of
New York sustained an underinclusiveness challenge to the state's rape law,
which included an exemption for spousal rape. After Liberta was convicted of
raping a woman who was not considered his wife under the statute,77 he at-
tacked the law on equal protection grounds, claiming that the statute treated
him differently from men who raped their wives. Citing Orr and Skinner, the
court first noted that "[a] litigant has standing to raise [an underinclusiveness]
claim even though he does not contend that under no circumstances could the
burden of the statute be imposed upon him." 78 The court next found that the
marital exemption violated both federal and state Equal Protection Clauses.79
Only then did the court analyze the remedy question, holding that the legisla-
ture, if faced with the choice, would probably extend prohibition of rape to
married persons, rather than abolish the crime altogether, leaving intact that
portion of the statute under which Liberta was convicted. Thus, Liberta's equal
protection argument won him a pyrrhic victory. 80 The opinion never mentions
75. Orr, 440 U.S. at 292 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977)); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), provides the most extreme example of this principle.
There, the Court permitted a nondependent husband to challenge a Social Security Act provision that
made dependency an eligibility requirement for husbands' benefits, but not for wives'. The Court adju-
dicated the merits even though a severability clause in the statute expressly stated that, if the provision
were found invalid, benefits would not be extended to nondependents of either sex.
76. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020
(1985).
77. In fact, Liberta raped his wife, but at the time of the offense he was under a court order to stay
away from her. In accordance with the statute, the court treated Liberta as if he raped a woman to whom
he was not married. 474 N.E.2d at 571.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 572-75. The court based its holding on the conclusion that "there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape." Id. at 573. Considering the extreme defer-
ence with which courts ordinarily apply rationality review, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-
29 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488-91 (1955), one may question the court's logic.
Nonetheless, heightened scrutiny justifies the decision. As a matter of due process, requiring that a
woman forfeit control of her body as a precondition to exercising her right to marry places an unconsti-
tutional burden on that right. Furthermore, as a matter of equal protection, the marital rape exemption
rests on a view of women which is inconsistent with the basic principle that women are full members of
American society. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2831 (1992) ("A State may not
give to a man the kind of dominion over his 'wife that parents exercise over their children."). For more
detailed analyses of the constitutionality of the marital rape exemption, see Robin West, Equality The-
ory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 45 (1990); Note,
To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARv. L. Rnv.
1255 (1986).
80. 474 N.E.2d at 578-80. This outcome illustrates the odd principle, endorsed in Orr, that a court
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the possibility that the court might have addressed the remedial issue before the
substantive equal protection question.
We have seen that for underinclusiveness claims, a litigant may challenge a
statute even if the ultimate remedy would be to expand its coverage in a way
that does not benefit her. In contrast, for overinclusiveness cases, the Salerno
rule prohibits a litigant from challenging a statute if the ultimate remedy would
be to sever the unconstitutional applications in a manner that precludes relief.
What justifies the difference? One might hypothesize that some fundamental
difference between underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness complaints ex-
plains Orr's contrast with the Salerno principle, but none of the cases discussed
so far suggests why such a difference supports the standing rules the Court has
adopted. Both remedial questions-whether to cure an underinclusive statute
by expansion or nullification and whether to cure an overinclusive statute by
severance or nullification-present issues of statutory interpretation. Yet no-
where does the Court indicate why, as a matter of state or federal principles of
statutory construction, different presumptions should be employed for the two
kinds of challenges.
2. R.A.V. and the underinclusive/overinclusive distinction.
One recent Supreme Court case provides insight into a plausible rationale
for treating standing differently in underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness
challenges. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,81 the Court held facially invalid an
ordinance that prohibited displaying a symbol known to "arouse anger, alarm,
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender."82
The Minnesota Supreme Court construed the ordinance to reach only "fighting
words," a class of speech not protected under the First Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court, however, ruled that the state may proscribe all
fighting words, but not a subset of fighting words based on content. 83 Concur-
ring in the judgment, Justice White, joined by three other Justices, severely
criticized what he termed the majority's novel "underbreadth" analysis. 84 The
may remedy a past equal protection violation by equal treatment in the future. A man who raped his
wife after the Liberta decision may be punished under the New York rape law. However, because due
process requires notice, persons who raped their wives prior to that decision may not be prosecuted for
rape because the statute at the time clearly exempted them. The remedy of prospective severance falls to
address Liberta's equal protection concern that a man who committed marital rape at the same time
Liberta committed nonmarital rape is unfairly advantaged under the law. The New York Court of Ap-
peals attempts to resolve this problem by breaking down Liberta's equal protection claim into two
separate claims: (1) unequal treatment of marital and nonmarital rapists; and (2) unequal treatment of
marital rapists before and after the announcement of the decision. The court states that prospective
abolition of the marital rape exemption cures the first defect, and that the second inequity survives
rational basis scrutiny because it vindicates the constitutional requirement of notice. Id. at 579-80. Not
benefitting from the remedy, Liberta actually won a hollow victory. No doubt the New York Court of
Appeals believed he deserved no more.
81. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
82. Ud. at 2541.
83. For an unconventional approach to the issues presented by R.A.V., see Akhil Reed Amar,
Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv. L. REv. 124
(1992).
84. 112 S. Ct. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
January 1994] 257
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
majority retorted that "the First Amendment imposes not an 'underinclusive-
ness' limitation but a 'content discrimination' limitation upon a State's prohibi-
tion of proscribable speech."'8 5 Implicit in this response is the following
argument:
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government
from punishing expression based on hostility to its content. Courts prohibit
content discrimination even when limited to a category of unprotected speech,
such as fighting words. Punishing X for the content of her speech constitutes
unequal treatment of X, not because the government fails to punish others for
their unprotected speech, but because it singles her out based on an illicit crite-
rion. Although the statute proscribing X's speech may be "underinclusive," its
unconstitutionality stems not from its underinclusive nature, but from its treat-
ment of X herself.
One need not strain analysis to apply the structure of this argument to equal
protection claims as well. 86 The analogous argument runs as follows:
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from punishing an indi-
vidual based on membership in a group defined by a suspect classification,
such as race. Courts prohibit such discrimination even when limited to unpro-
tected conduct such as littering. Punishing X for her race (or membership in a
group defined by some other suspect classification) constitutes unequal treat-
ment of X, not because the government fails to punish others for littering, but
because it singles her out based on membership in a group defined by a suspect
classification. Although the statute punishing X's conduct may be "underin-
clusive," its unconstitutionality stems not from its underinclusive nature, but
from its treatment of X herself.
The Court apparently accepts this reasoning, subject only to the caveat that
a court may ultimately deny relief to the litigant who mounts a successful un-
derinclusiveness challenge. Under current constitutional doctrine, a litigant
who makes an underinclusiveness challenge-whether based on the Equal Pro-
tection Clause or some other constitutional norm87 -need not face the kind of
preliminary hurdle which Yazoo and Salerno purport to require for overinclu-
siveness challenges. Yet, notwithstanding the current state of the law, the argu-
ment I have drawn from R.A. V. remains difficult to sustain.
85. Id. at 2545 (opinion of the Court).
86. For a discussion of the relationship between the First Amendment and the principle of equal
treatment, see Amar, supra note 83, at 130 nA6; Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in
the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. Ra,. 20 (1975).
87. One can construct analogous arguments for other constitutional norms containing an equal
protection component, such as the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. See Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (holding unconstitutional a series of
ordinances prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice because the ordinances targeted the Santeria religion);
Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (holding that a
state law of general applicability denying unemployment benefits to Native Americans fired for using an
illegal drug (peyote) for religious purposes does not trigger heightened scrutiny, but noting the unconsti-
tutionality of a law prohibiting acts "only when they are engaged in for religious reasons"). The Court's
approach to free exercise claims in Church of Lukumi and Smith is very much at odds with the Salerno
standard, because the Court asks only whether the law at issue is neutral, treating its application to the
persons affected by it as essentially irrelevant. See note 68 supra (discussing "underinclusiveness" in
Establishment Clause cases).
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Consider a hypothetical statute that punishes people for littering on property
owned by white persons but not on property owned by persons of a different
race. The statute violates equal protection because it employs a race-based
classification that is not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Sup-
pose the state charges a white defendant with littering on another white per-
son's property. The defendant would base her equal protection objection on the
fact that had she littered on a nonwhite person's property she would not have
committed an offense. She would claim that the court should apply strict scru-
tiny because only the race of her victim distinguishes her from a litterer on
nonwhite-owned property.
Notably, our hypothetical litterer cannot rely on the view expressed above
that challenges to underinclusiveness involve personal rights. The law does not
single her out based on her race. Rather, the statute singles out nonwhite prop-
erty owners by denying them the protection against litterers that their white
counterparts receive. The law classifies property owners, not the defendant,
based on race.88
Courts, however, have not treated this distinction-between laws that use a
suspect classification to describe the victim and those that use one to describe
the defendant-as significant. Liberta illustrates this point. The class truly
aggrieved by the marital rape exemption consists of married women denied the
protection against rape afforded to unmarried women.89 Nonetheless, New
York's highest court treated the case as one invoking the defendant's right to
equal protection.
A litigant can always formulate her claim so that it appears that an underin-
clusive statute singles her out in an illicit manner based on a characteristic of
her person or her conduct by describing her status or conduct in a manner
which incorporates the impermissible underinclusiveness. The cross-burner in
R.A.V. claims that the law singles out his conduct because he directed it against
people protected because of their race. The rapist in Liberta complains that the
criminal code singles out his conduct because he directed it against a woman
who was not his wife. And the litterer in my hypothetical example suggests
that the law singles her out because of her victim's race. Yet, unlike the Afri-
can-American punished for littering under a statute that makes littering a crime
only if committed by an African-American, the impermissible discrimination
evoked in each of these cases has nothing to do with the perpetrator.
A more sensitive approach to equal protection and related cases would rec-
ognize the inherent difference between cases in which a litigant claims that a
88. This does not mean that the white defendant cannot challenge the statute. She may show that
the distinction between her and the person who litters on nonwhite-owned property is irrational, and
therefore unconstitutional. Yet, we can imagine a lamentable situation in which the distinction would be
rational. Suppose, for instance, that a white population lives in a community segregated from other
races, and that some local condition makes litter a particularly hazardous health risk in the white part of
town but not elsewhere. The municipality might "rationally" use race as a proxy for locale in targeting
its ordinance to the problem.
89. Alternatively, one might define the aggrieved class as women generally. By relying on and
perpetuating sexist stereotypes of women's status vis-A-vis their husbands, the marital rape exemption
treats all women as inferior to men. See note 79 supra.
January 1994)
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:235
statute singles her out based on an illicit criterion and those in which she asserts
that the law has unfair discriminatory effects on others. Statutory construction
questions aside, courts should treat the latter category of cases as equivalent to
cases in which a litigant challenges an unconstitutional rule of law, although its
unconstitutionality does not stem from its effect on the litigant. In other words,
courts should treat the latter group of underinclusiveness cases similarly to
cases of overinclusiveness. 90
Most likely, the Court has failed to recognize the proposed distinction be-
cause, as a matter of substantive constitutional law, it views the drawing of
various nonneutral lines as a constitutional violation, irrespective of the practi-
cal effect those lines have on the affected persons. 91 This view conforms with
the Court's free speech jurisprudence, which tends to stress the value of speech
itself, apart from the rights of individual speakers.92 By analogy, the real issue
in any equal protection case (or any other case involving neutrality norms)
hinges on whether the statute uses an improper classification, apart from how it
classifies the individual litigant. If the Court labels the classification itself as
the harm, then the statute structurally violates the Constitution, and all litigants
invoking the improper classification claim something other than a personal
right.93 This would explain the Court's view in Orr that all equal protection
challenges must stand or fall together, but is difficult to square with the major-
ity's rejoinder to Justice White in R.A.V. 94
Whatever the reason, the Court does not treat underinclusiveness challenges
the same way that Salerno purports to treat overinclusiveness challenges.
While the Court might justifiably distinguish between underinclusiveness chal-
90. As I explain in greater detail throughout this article, I do not endorse the application of the
Salerno presumption in the latter category of cases.
91. Dissenting in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987), Justice Brennan implied that, in
his view, there is no constitutional difference between being singled out based upon one's own race and
being singled out based on the race of one's victim.
92. This notion underlies the First Amendment right to receive information, see Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking down a
statute for placing unconstitutional limits on First Amendment rights by imposing an affirmative obliga-
tion on the addressees of foreign "communist propaganda" mail to request receipt before the Postmaster
would deliver), as well as the principle that the First Amendment protects speech by corporations, see
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny and
sustaining a requirement that corporate independent expenditures be made from a segregated fund); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) ("The proper question... is not whether
corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natu-
ral persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the law] abridges expression that the First Amend-
ment was meant to protect.").
93. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), provides dramatic confirmation of this view of equal
protection. In Shaw, the Court held that white plaintiffs may state an equal protection claim by alleging
that reapportionment legislation is designed "so extremely irregular[ly] on its face" as to separate voters
by race without sufficient justification. Id. at 2824. The harm in Shaw is, quite literally, the drawing of
lines based on race. But see id. at 2834-37 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
(contending that the plaintiffs had not suffered a cognizable injury).
94. See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra. The difference might be explained by distinguish-
ing between the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Speech Clause. Both Clauses contain a neutrality
norm, but the Free Speech Clause contains an additional individual rights norm. On this view, content
discrimination is prohibited not only because it requires the drawing of nonneutral lines, but also be-
cause it is censorship-an infringement of the individual rights of the speaker.
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lenges involving the litigant's traits from those involving traits of a third party,
the Court treats all underinclusiveness challenges in the same manner. Simply
stated, the Court's unawareness of its inconsistent treatment of underinclusive-
ness and overinclusiveness may best explain this discrepancy. At present, we
know that, whatever else its scope, the Salerno presumption does not apply to
underinclusiveness challenges.
B. Overbreadth Doctrine and the Salerno Principle
The Court has expressly recognized that one substantive constitutional
norm, the First Amendment's protection of free speech, is inappropriate for the
application of the Salerno rule. As the Court stated in Salerno itself, First
Amendment "overbreadth" doctrine-which holds that a litigant may claim
that a statute should not be applied to her solely because it would be unconstitu-
tional to apply it to a third party not before the court-warrants the facial inval-
idation of a statute in exception to the Salerno principle. 95 Although the
Salerno Court correctly recognizes this overbreadth doctrine, it incorrectly as-
sumes that it has no application outside the First Amendment arena. As I show
in this section, an examination of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine
reveals that its special standing component and concerns about the "chilling"
effects of overbroad laws have properly been applied in other fundamental
rights cases. With this in mind, I define the proper scope of overbreadth doc-
trine and apply my analysis to one right outside the free speech context-the
right to abortion.
1. The special standing component to First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine.
Two rationales for First Amendment overbreadth doctrine dominate the ac-
ademic literature. According to one view, because overbroad laws have a chil-
ling effect on the expressive rights of parties not directly threatened by coercive
action, litigants should have special standing to assert third parties' rights.
96
95. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
96. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,2553 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The overbreadth doctrine has the redeeming virtue of attempting to avoid the chilling of
protected expression."); Gutar~m, supra note 11, at 1191-92. For a thoughtful discussion of the chilling
effect, see Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect, " 58
B.U. L. REv. 685 (1978) (arguing that the chilling effect doctrine is a sound response to uncertainty in
the legal process and the judgment that free speech is a preferred value).
Fallon identifies another justification for a special First Amendment overbreadth doctrine based on
concern about danger of selective enforcement of laws regulating conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment. Fallon, supra note 30, at 884.
The risk, however, that an overbroad statute will cloak legislative pursuit of illegitimate ends or
unbridled prosecutorial discretion, see i, is not unique to situations involving First Amendment rights
or even fundamental rights generally. Indeed, the Court has noted that the Due Process Clause's prohi-
bition on vague laws responds particularly to the danger of selective enforcement. See, e.g., Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) ("[Ihe void for vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness ... in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement."). The substantive law of vagueness does not require an exception to
the Salerno presumption; indeed, it contains its own version. It is well established that a litigant whose
conduct is clearly proscribed by a statute cannot complain that the statute would be ambiguous as ap-
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Typically, adherents of this approach claim that the ordinary case-by-case nar-
rowing of a law with potentially unconstitutional applications is inadequate to
protects First Amendment rights;97 if citizens believe that a statute prohibits
activity protected by the First Amendment, they will censor themselves.98 In
short, under this argument, the Constitution requires a presumption of non-
severability where rights of expression are concerned.
Under a second view, associated with Professor Monaghan, First Amend-
ment overbreadth doctrine does not stand as an exception to the ordinary ap-
proach to statutes with both constitutional and unconstitutional applications. 99
Rather, "[o]verbreadth simply expresses th[e] requirement of a substantively
valid rule in the context of First Amendment substantive law."'100 This ap-
proach requires no special standing rules. Instead, First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine follows automatically from substantive First Amendment
doctrine.' 0 ' In particular, the Court's invalidation of overbroad laws reflects
the substantive First Amendment principle that laws regulating expression be
the "least restrictive means" of accomplishing their ends.102 A law that inter-
feres with protected expressive activity cannot be the least restrictive means of
prohibiting proscribable activity, and, according to Monaghan, the Court conse-
quently strikes down such laws.' 03
Monaghan's account of overbreadth doctrine leads logically to the conclu-
plied to a third party. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) ("One to whose conduct a
statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness."). Only a statute which is so
vague as to provide no "ascertainable standard" for inclusion or exclusion, and thus has no core applica-
tions, will be invalidated as facially vague. E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)
("[T]his ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right to assembly
to an unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of
constitutionally protected conduct."); see also TaBE, supra note 30, § 1232, at 1036. Accordingly, I do
not treat selective enforcement as a unique First Amendment issue.
97. See, e.g., TPmE, supra note 30, § 1227, at 1023 ("[G]radually cutting away the unconstitu-
tional aspects of a statute by invalidating its improper applications case by case... does not respond
sufficiently to the peculiarly vulnerable character of activities protected by the first amendment."); Note,
supra note 30, at 865-82.
98. Some critics have found the conventional account of the chilling effect and the overbreadth
solution unconvincing on the ground that most citizens are unaware of laws regulating expression, much
less of their judicial constructions. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court
and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031, 1040-41 (1984); Note, Over-
breadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 532, 546 (1974). The assumption that people
know the law so pervades our law, however, that any convincing critique of a legal doctrine must do
more than point out that the assumption sometimes runs counter to fact. Moreover, in some cases,
individuals likely to feel the chill of an overbroad law-such as government employees fearful of losing
their jobs if they speak out-may have access to organizations-such as labor unions--capable of de-
veloping litigation strategies that take advantage of overbreadth doctrine. Fallon, supra note 30, at 886-
89. Overbreadth doctrine thus effectively responds to the very real threat that overbroad laws pose to
free expression.
99. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 12-14; Henry Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 CoLutM.
L. REv. 277, 282-86 (1984); see also BATOR Er AL., supra note 55, at 174 & n.6 (listing earlier sources
providing suggestions along similar lines).
100. Monaghan, supra note 24, at 24; accord TrmE, supra note 30, § 1227, at 1023-24.
101. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 21-22.
102. Id. at 23, 37 & n.152; accord GuNTHrr, supra note 11, at 1201-02.
103. Monaghan's attempt to ground overbreadth doctrine in substantive constitutional law is con-
nected to his emphasis on the right to be judged by a constitutionally valid law. For, in the end, there
may be no constitutionally privileged acts; the state may infringe even rights of expression if it narrowly
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sion that the doctrine is also appropriate wherever the least-restrictive-means
analysis appears. Since the least-restrictive-means test serves as an essential
component of strict scrutiny, which applies to all fundamental rights cases,
under Monaghan's approach, all laws burdening fundamental rights should trig-
ger overbreadth analysis. 1°4
Monaghan also argues that the Court permits state courts to construe and
sever statutory provisions regarding speech as it does in other areas.' 05 Thus,
he finds no special rule of nonseverability in the First Amendment area.
Monaghan wrongly concludes, however, that the absence of nonseverability
rules also implies an absence of a special standing component to the Court's
overbreadth cases.
Case law only partially supports Monaghan's view that overbreadth doc-
trine merely reflects substantive constitutional law,' 06 and Professor Fallon ob-
serves that Monaghan's account of overbreadth doctrine contradicts what the
Supreme Court and lower courts actually do in overbreadth cases. 10 7 Fallon
posits that courts do indeed employ a distinctive standing component to First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, although it may not operate as a general rule
of nonseverability.10 8 Fallon describes and justifies this special standing prin-
ciple by analyzing numerous First Amendment cases in which the Court
facially invalidates an overbroad statute expressly because of the concern that,
although constitutionally applicable to the litigant before the Court, it would
chill the expressive rights of others.'0 9 In addition, he argues that the Court has
tailors its regulation to serve a compelling state interest. What matters in each case is the government's
reason for regulation, or in other words, the rule of law applied.
104. Cf Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412,424-26 (1981) (implicitly equating an inquiry into whether
a statute burdening the fundamental right to travel is "overbroad" with a "least restrictive means" test).
105. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 14-23.
106. For an example of authority supporting Monaghan, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
768 n.21 (1982) (citing Monaghan for the proposition that "[a] person whose activity may be constitu-
tionally regulated nevertheless may argue that the statute under which he is convicted or regulated is
invalid on its face"). The Court's recent decision in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct.
2696 (1993), supports a corollary of the principle-if not the principle itself-that overbreadth doctrine
merely expresses the requirement that laws abridging speech be the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing a compelling governmental purpose. In Edge Broadcasting, the Court held that where substan-
tive First Amendment doctrine does not require the narrowest possible fit between ends and means, even
an as-applied challenge to an apparently overbroad statute may fail. Id. at 2705 (noting that, with
respect to commercial speech and time, place, or manner restrictions, the validity of a law will be judged
"by the relation it bears to the general problem of accommodating the policies" which it was designed to
further, "not by the extent to which it furthers the Government's interest in an individual case"); see also
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1805 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute regu-
lating commercial speech which can survive the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 566-72 (1980), should be immune to an as-applied
challenge).
107. See Fallon, supra note 30, at 871-75.
108. Id. at 867-75. A nascent version of Fallon's view is set forth in Note, Inseparability in
Application of Statutes Impairing Civil Liberties, 61 HARv. L. RaV. 1208 (1948). Both the author of the
Note and Fallon argue that overbreadth doctrine creates a special rule of nonseverability specific to the
First Amendment context. See Fallon, supra note 30, at 898-99; Note, supra, at 1211. In addition, both
contend that notwithstanding overbreadth doctrine, a facially overbroad statute regulating expression
may be applied prospectively if authoritatively narrowed. See Fallon, supra note 30, at 898-99; Note,
supra, at 1211. In this latter respect, they agree with Monaghan.
109. See Fallon, supra note 30, at 873-75. Statements like the following from Village of Schaum-
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historically and consistently interpreted the First Amendment to include a dis-
tinctive standing component. 10 Thus, at least in practice, much of overbreadth
doctrine functions in terms of standing.
A complete treatment of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is beyond
the scope of this article. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the doc-
trine limits courts' application of the Salerno presumption in First Amendment
cases. We may now ask: Does something special about First Amendment
rights warrant treating other rights differently in evaluating facial overbreadth
challenges, or can we generalize the limits of severability beyond the realm of
free expression to other constitutional guarantees?
2. Overbreadth doctrine and fundamental rights.
While Fallon recognizes that much of the "argument concerning the proper
contours of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine would support a doctrine of
equal sweep in cases involving alleged infringements of other fundamental
rights," I11 he limits his justification of the doctrine to the First Amendment. 1 2
He does so in part because courts and commentators typically focus on this
area," 3 and in part because the First Amendment is special: 'The First
Amendment, more even than other constitutional provisions conferring funda-
mental rights, contributes vitally to the preservation of an open, democratic
political regime, at the same time as it secures rights of high importance to
particular individuals."' '14
Nevertheless, strong theoretical and practical reasons, some of which the
Court has adopted, justify extending the overbreadth doctrine beyond the First
Amendment. As an initial matter, the First Amendment is not alone in preserv-
ing an open democratic political regime. For example, a state that tolerates
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), are quite common in the Court's
overbreadth cases:
Given a case or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless
challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of
other parties not before the court. In these First Amendment contexts, the courts are inclined
to disregard the normal rule against permitting one whose conduct may validly be prohibited
to challenge the proscription as it applies to others because of the possibility that protected
speech or associative activities may be inhibited by the overly broad reach of the statute.
Id. at 634 (citations omitted); accord Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2774 (1993) ("The
'overbreadth' doctrine, which is a departure from traditional rules of standing, permits a defendant to
make a facial challenge to an overly broad statute restricting speech, even if he himself has engaged in
speech that could be regulated under a more narrowly drawn statute.").
110. Fallon, supra note 30, at 863-64, 869-70. This is true even where the Court has emphasized
the narrowness of overbreadth doctrine. For example, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973),
the Court limited the doctrine by requiring "substantial" overbreadth, at least in cases challenging the
speech-restrictive effects of statutes aimed at non-expressive conduct. Id. at 615. Nonetheless, the
majority stated: "[Tihe Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit-in the First
Amendment area-'attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite
narrow specificity."' Id. at 612 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
111. Fallon, supra note 30, at 884 n.192.
112. Id.
113. Id. For the same reason, I focus primarily on facial challenges outside the First Amendment
context.
114. Id.
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dissent but disrespects privacy hardly presents a model democratic polity; thus,
the Fourth Amendment undoubtedly serves an important democratizing func-
tion. And while the First Amendment may have a greater democracy-preserv-
ing role than, say, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, so what? The Eighth Amendment engenders a regime in which
human beings act compassionately toward all, even the most despised. The
Constitution protects citizens not only as political actors but as private beings
with interests shielded from the political world. To treat some democracy-pre-
serving constitutional provisions as privileged contravenes the Constitution's
own architecture.1 15 Indeed, the "rights of high importance" secured by the
First Amendment may, at particular times or for particular people, be less im-
portant than those secured by other constitutional provisions, such as the right
to bodily integrity. 116 Furthermore, the chilling effect that justifies First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine may operate against other fundamental
rights, and therefore may justify a special overbreadth doctrine for all funda-
mental rights.
Not all fundamental rights are subject to the kind of chilling effect that
justifies the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine, however. First Amend-
ment rights differ functionally from some other constitutionally protected
rights. The right to free speech is a right to engage in primary conduct. It
protects against government interference with one's action in a realm independ-
ent of government functions. While speech may attempt to influence govern-
mental policy, it occurs in an arena that the government does not create.117
In contrast, litigation rights have meaning only within the context of an
adversarial proceeding. The Bill of Rights guarantees many litigation rights,
including, for example, the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
While the free speech right delineates a protected zone into which government
may not enter, the right against self-incrimination does not. Indeed, a free-
standing zone of non-self-incrimination is meaningless; one can only exercise
the right within a zone created and operated by the government, namely crimi-
nal prosecution proceedings.
With respect to facial challenges, a primary conduct right differs critically
from a litigation right. Because individuals do not exercise litigation rights on
their own, but only in the context of a government created adversarial proceed-
115. See LAURENCE H. TRmE & MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 25-27 (1991)
(arguing that no unitary theory of the Constitution can justify favoring one part of the Constitution over
another).
116. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2810 (1992) (describing Roe in part as
providing a rule of personal autonomy and bodily integrity). I do not minimize the importance of First
Amendment rights from the individual's perspective. My point is simply that for many people the right
to speak may seem less important than the right to decide whether and when to form intimate associa-
tions or bear intrusive bodily burdens.
117. Private speech on government property raises unique concerns, which the Supreme Court
treats under its public forum doctrine. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (describing the constitutional significance attaching to the determination that
public property constitutes a traditional public forum, a designated forum, or a nonpublic forum). The
fact that special rules apply to free speech on government property demonstrates that the paradigmatic
case of free speech involves a purely private realm.
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ing, an overbroad law will not stop an individual not before the court from
engaging in protected conduct. As a consequence, litigation rights are not sus-
ceptible to a chilling effect. 118
To illustrate, consider Salerno. For the moment, let us assume the pre-
sumption of severability as a matter of justifiable subconstitutional law. 119
Should we nevertheless worry that by forbidding Salerno to challenge the Bail
Reform Act's bail criterion-dangerousness to the community-we will chill
future detainees from exercising their Eighth Amendment right to reasonable
bail? This is not a serious concern. One can only exercise the right to reason-
able bail during judicial proceedings. Consequently, if a future detainee wishes
to challenge the amount or denial of her bail for resting on a constitutionally
illegitimate criterion, the Bail Reform Act does not chill her from doing so. We
do not need Salerno to stand in for future detainees because they will already be
in court where their conduct will receive judicial scrutiny. Apart from Sa-
lerno's personal right to be judged by a constitutional rule of law, 120 his litiga-
tion right to reasonable bail does not inherently challenge the presumption of
severability.
Litigation rights, however, form only a subset of the category of procedural
rights. The term "procedural right" refers generally to a right that can be exer-
cised only in a government-created forum, although not necessarily a court-
room. An example of a nonlitigation procedural right is the fundamental
constitutional right to vote. 121 It is procedural because citizens exercise it only
in elections conducted by the government. 122
Like the right to free speech, some nonlitigation procedural rights may suc-
cumb to a chilling effect. Consider again the right to vote. In 1966, in Harper
v. Virginia Board of Elections, 23 the Court held that a state-imposed poll tax
unconstitutionally infringes this right.124 To illustrate the chilling issue, sup-
118. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), could be viewed as an exception to the general
principle that litigation rights are not susceptible to the kind of chill which justifies overbreadth analysis.
The Barrows Court permitted a defendant in an action seeking damages for noncompliance with a
racially restrictive covenant to argue that enforcement would constitute unconstitutional racial discrimi-
nation, albeit not against her. The Court, after acknowledging the equivalent of the Yazoo principle, id.
at 255-57, distinguished Barrows as "a unique situation in which it is the action of the state court which
might result in a denial of constitutional rights and in which it would be difficult if not impossible for
the persons whose rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court." Id. at 257. Barrows
squares with my general approach to litigation rights, however, because the right at issue differs from
most litigation rights: In Barrows, the class of persons to whom the right attaches may never appear
before a court. Note also that, although Barrows is an equal protection case, the Court treats it appropri-
ately under the standing rules usually applicable to individual rights cases. Il at 259-60; see text ac-
companying notes 65-68 supra.
119. But see text accompanying notes 218-264 infra (discussing the institutional limits to the
presumption of severability).
120. See text accompanying notes 24-54 supra (analyzing the right to be judged by a constitu-
tional rule of law).
121. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) ("[S]tatutes
distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society.").
122. Of course, people may vote in all sorts of nongovernmental elections-for corporate direc-
tors, union leaders, all-star teams, and so forth-but in doing so they do not exercise the fundamental
constitutional right to vote.
123. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
124. Id. at 666. The Court decided Harper shortly after the ratification of the Twenty-Fourth
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pose that in 1965 a wealthy Virginia citizen decides that she no longer wishes
to pay the poll tax, and attempts to vote without paying it. The state may argue
that the tax does not constrain the citizen's rights because she is both able and
willing (as demonstrated by her past compliance) to pay the tax. Our wealthy
voter might offer an overbreadth defense, however, arguing that the law should
permit her to challenge the poll tax because poor persons (or persons of means
who would only vote if voting were free or taxed at some lower amount) will
not even attempt to vote, and thus, their right to vote will be chilled by the
existence of the statute.
The Harper Court effectively decided that this chilling effect indeed justi-
fies a kind of overbreadth analysis, invalidating the poll tax without ever in-
quiring whether Harper himself could have afforded to pay it.125 The Harper
court thereby implicitly extended overbreadth analysis to a non-First Amend-
ment, nonlitigation right.
Before generalizing from the voting example, it is revealing to consider
three objections to this analysis. First, one might object to the proposition that
Harper stands for the extension of overbreadth analysis outside the First
Amendment, arguing that the right to vote, as a right to political participation,
is a First Amendment right. This argument ultimately fails, as the Court in
Harper expressly avoided resting its decision on that ground. 126 Furthermore,
if the right to vote is a First Amendment right, it is at best an "implicit" one, as
the petitioner urged in Harper.127 While I fully recognize the importance and
legitimacy of such an implicit right,' 28 virtually all unenumerated rights exist
implicitly in some provision of the Bill of Rights, most often in the First
Amendment.129 Thus the objection-that overbreadth analysis applies to the
right to vote only because that right is really a First Amendment right-actually
would extend the overbreadth doctrine well beyond its conventional First
Amendment context.
A second objection to the voting example might focus on whether our hy-
pothetical reluctant poll tax-payer is in fact bringing an overbreadth challenge,
when she has a personal constitutional right to vote without paying a poll tax
Amendment, which expressly prohibits poll taxes in federal elections. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV,
§ 1.
125. 383 U.S. at 666 ("[A] State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.") (em-
phasis added).
126. Id. at 665.
127. Id. Note that the First Amendment implicitly includes the right to vote in a different way
than the right to speak includes a right not to speak. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)
("[Tihe right of freedom of thought.., includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all."). The latter is merely a specific instance of the former. If the right to vote is
implicit in the First Amendment, this is only because it mirrors those rights that receive explicit recogni-
tion: Our constitutional regime of self-government cannot function without a right to vote.
128. See TREBE & DoRa, supra note 115, at 77 (praising Justice Harlan's "process of interpolation
and extrapolation" of implicit rights from the express provisions of the Bill of Rights described in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
129. For example, most of the specific rights grouped under the rubric of a constitutional right of
privacy can plausibly be derived from the right of association, itself implicit in the First Amendment's
Freedom of Assembly Clause.
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whether or not she can afford it. In other words, she complains not merely
about being judged by a rule of law that is unconstitutional as applied to others,
but unconstitutional as applied to her. This argument, however, ignores the
basis for the Court's holding in Harper. The Court found the poll tax unconsti-
tutional as a matter of equal protection 130 and invalidated the statute because
"[vioter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying
this or any other tax."'131 The Constitution does not privilege free voting for its
own sake; rather, any system of poll taxation that sufficiently responds to indi-
vidual circumstances will give state officials too much discretion in making the
necessary individual determinations. 132
The response to the second objection suggests a third: Because the Court
sustained the facial challenge in Harper on equal protection grounds, the deci-
sion does not establish the validity of overbreadth challenges involving finda-
mental rights.133 This objection, however, ignores the fact that a statute
employing a suspect classification or restricting fundamental rights triggers
equal protection strict scrutiny.13 4 Indeed, the Harper Court applied equal pro-
tection strict scrutiny because the Virginia poll tax interfered with the individ-
ual's right to vote, an interest the Court termed a "'fundamental political
right.'"135 Equal protection strict scrutiny of statutes that restrict fundamental
rights is no different in practice from the strict scrutiny applied in cases chal-
lenging restrictions on constitutionally privileged conduct. Both laws which
directly restrict constitutionally privileged conduct such as free speech and laws
which restrict fundamental rights such as the right to vote must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 136 In short, Harper can only be
explained as an instance of overbreadth analysis outside the narrow context of
free speech.
3. The scope of overbreadth doctrine.
If overbreadth analysis may be applied to statutes other than those restrict-
130. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
131. Id.
132. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959) (upholding
literacy test for voting, but observing that a literacy test which granted a state official unfettered author-
ity to make literacy determinations would be unconstitutional). Professor Tribe observes that the Court
decided Lassiter before it began to apply strict scrutiny to voting restrictions, and he doubts that
Lassiter's principal holding would "survive the properly herculean demands of strict equal protection
review." TRIBE, supra note 30, § 1315, at 1093. Undoubtedly, Lassiter's dictum limiting the state's
power to delegate voting qualification decisions to individual officials remains good law. See Lassiter,
360 U.S. at 53.
133. Recall that equal protection underinclusiveness challenges are not subject to the Salerno
presumption. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
134. Although Harper suggests that wealth-based classifications are suspect, 383 U.S. at 668
(terming wealth a "traditionally disfavored" classification akin to race), that plainly is not the law, see
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that poverty is not a suspect classification), and the
Harper court did not rest its decision on this notion.
135. 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
136. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501,
512 (1991) (holding that a New York statute that redirected income earned by criminals was not "nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the State's objective of compensating crime victims from the profits of
crime").
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ing First Amendment rights, what then is the proper scope of overbreadth doc-
trine? Before answering, note that the list of non-First Amendment,
nonlitigation fundamental rights is actually quite short. Other than the First
Amendment, none of the express provisions of the Bill of Rights grants an
express constitutional privilege to engage in primary conduct. The Supreme
Court could conceivably interpret the Second Amendment to privilege gun
ownership, but it has not chosen to do so. 137 Arguably, the Third Amendment
protects the homeowner's "fundamental right" to refuse to house troops in
peacetime, although the provision is more sensibly read, like the Fourth
Amendment, as a limitation upon the means of government intrusion. Simi-
larly, the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment does not privilege private
conduct, but prescribes the means by which government may interfere with
property ownership, a form of private conduct. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment protects certain primary conduct from government intrusion,
but only as a matter of substantive due process, not as an expressly enumerated
right. The remaining provisions of the Fifth through Eighth Amendments con-
cern litigation rights, and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments do not expressly
recognize any rights at all.
Because the Bill of Rights, excluding the First Amendment, does not ex-
pressly privilege any primary conduct, all other nonlitigation fundamental
rights must be unenumerated. 138 Since the demise of heightened scrutiny for
regulation of economic affairs, 139 nearly all of these rights fall under the gen-
eral umbrella of a right of "privacy."' 4 In short, the Constitution privileges
relatively few areas of primary conduct. Thus, with little danger of opening the
floodgates, we can say that overbreadth analysis applies only to First Amend-
ment rights and the relatively few unenumerated nonlitigation fundamental
rights, such as those stemming from a general right of privacy.
A critic of this conclusion might advocate limiting overbreadth doctrine to
the First Amendment based on the unique nature of speech. While rights of
privacy protect personal moral decisions from government interference, free
speech is an affirmative good. Consider abortion. The Court has held that the
state may, in some circumstances, favor childbirth over abortion. 141 Although
more speech may be better than less speech, no parallel assumption suggests
that more abortion is better than less abortion. Thus, the critic argues, chilling
137. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (stating that "legislative restric-
tions on the use of firearms are neither based upon suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitu-
tionally protected liberties").
138. While both the Bill of Rights and Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution place limits on the
affirmative powers granted to the federal government, these limits do not take the form of privileges to
engage in primary conduct.
139. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)) (holding that economic regulation that is "reasonable in relation to its
subject" is constitutional).
140. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HArv. L. REv. 737 (1989) (arguing that
the right of privacy delineates the "legitimate limits of governmental power").
141. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2825 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(upholding Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting period as a "persuasive measure[ ] which favor[s] child-
birth over abortion").
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abortion and other privacy rights poses a less serious constitutional problem
than chilling free speech.
This argument fundamentally misconceives the abortion right as well as
other privacy rights. It is the right to choose an abortion that warrants constitu-
tional protection, not the right to have one.142 The state may attempt to influ-
ence a woman's choice, but it may not take that choice away from her.143 The
Court implicitly recognizes that where privacy rights such as abortion are at
stake, more choice (whether of abortion or childbirth) is constitutionally better
than less.
Similarly, the free speech right can be characterized as a right to choose
whether or not to speak. Indeed, the Court has recognized that the right not to
speak is no less prized than the right to speak. 144 In invalidating a state law
requiring newspapers to print reader replies to newspaper-authored editorials,
the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo'45 agreed with the con-
tention that "the statute [wa]s void on its face because it purport[ed] to regu-
late the content of a newspaper in violation of the First Amendment."' 46 In
short, a distinction between a right to choose, such as the right to choose abor-
tion, and a right to exercise a constitutional privilege, such as free speech, does
not justify confining overbreadth analysis solely to challenges based on the
First Amendment.
Robust overbreadth analysis is particularly appropriate when the law im-
poses restrictions on the choice to have an abortion. Due to pregnancy's tem-
porary nature, pregnant women may find case-by-case legal relief from
abortion restrictions particularly impractical. Suppose a woman discovers that
she is three months pregnant and wishes to obtain an abortion. If a state law
prohibits her from doing so or makes it overly difficult for her to do so, the
statute would be invalid as applied to her. However, if we require challenges to
overbroad statutes to proceed on a case-by-case basis, she may not obtain a
declaratory judgment on its invalidity as applied to her in time to exercise her
142. Id. at 2804 (recognizing "the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion... without
undue interference from the State") (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 2821 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (stating that "a state mea-
sure designed to persuade [a woman] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably
related to that goal").
144. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the First Amendment precludes
New Hampshire from requiring citizens to display the state motto on their license plates); West Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (ruling that the state may not compel the flag salute
and pledge of allegiance).
145. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
146. Id. at 247. Although the Court in Miami Herald does not use the term "overbreadth," re-
course to that doctrine explains why the Court invalidated the statute on its face rather than as applied.
If the Court had applied the Salerno presumption, the Court would have had to uphold the statute on its
face because it had severable constitutional applications. For example, a statute that simply requires a
newspaper publisher to print a retraction of a defamatory statement is constitutional because the govern-
ment has "a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." Rosen-
blatt v. Bair, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). The Florida statute could conceivably be constitutionally applied
to compel a publisher to print a retraction that the defamed party had drafted. Yet the Court did not
consider this possibility. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Court's holding with respect to "right of reply" statutes "implies no view
upon the constitutionality of retraction statutes").
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right. Also, she may not wish to pursue what she sees as an uncertain and
expensive legal remedy, especially if she lacks legal sophistication or financial
resources. Instead, she may travel to a different state to obtain an abortion,
engage in self-help, or simply carry the unwanted pregnancy to term. 147 Thus,
requiring that challenges to an overbroad statute prohibiting abortion proceed
on a case-by-case basis will chill a woman's right to choose an abortion.
In addition, the fact that an abortion can only be carried out with the aid of
a third party-typically a doctor-renders the right to choose an abortion par-
ticularly susceptible to a chilling effect. 148 To exercise her right of choice, both
the pregnant woman and the necessary medical personnel must have sufficient
courage to disregard the chilling effect of potential state sanctions. 149 And be-
cause the right to choose abortion depends upon the cooperation of medical
personnel, overbreadth doctrine offers an effective antidote to the chilling ef-
fect. As I have noted before, 150 overbreadth doctrine works best when individ-
uals who feel the chill of an overbroad statute can depend on an institution with
greater financial and legal resources-such as a hospital or abortion clinic-to
challenge the statute on its face.
4. The Court's privacy jurisprudence and the Salerno principle.
I have argued that the chilling effect justifies First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine as well as overbreadth doctrine for other fundamental rights. I have
also argued that the Court has adopted overbreadth analysis to scrutinize stat-
utes that restrict fundamental rights in a manner that raises questions of equal
protection. But what is the law regarding facial challenges to statutes burden-
ing non-First Amendment rights? Does the account I gave merely prescribe
what the law should be, or does it actually describe the law as it stands?
I return, then, to the question I posed at the beginning of the article: Is
Justice Scalia correct when he states in his dissent from denial of certiorari in
147. In Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992), the Fifth
Circuit dismissed a facial challenge to a Mississippi statute that requires women to wait 24 hours be-
tween seeing a doctor and obtaining an abortion. After Mississippi began enforcing this statute, the
number of abortions performed in the state fell by roughly half. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline to
Hear Abortion Case, N.Y. Tn-Ms, Dec. 8, 1992, at A22; Mark Mayfield, 24-Hour Wait Biggest Part of
"Obstacle Course," USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 1993, at 5A. While part of the decline is no doubt due to
women travelling to other states, at least some women who previously would have had abortions are
simply having babies. See id. If a putatively constitutional limitation can have such a chilling effect, an
even more burdensome law would certainly chill the abortion right.
148. Even RU486, the so-called "abortion pill." must be taken under the direction of a doctor.
Philip J. Hilts, Door May Be Open for Abortion Pill to Be Sold in U.S., N.Y. TIES, Feb. 25, 1993, at
Al.
149. Overbreadth andjus tertii doctrine, while distinguishable, are closely connected. See BAToR
r AL., supra note 55, at 169-70 (noting distinctions between third-party claims and overbreadth chal-
lenges). Emphasizing jus tertii doctrine, the Court has permitted doctors to challenge abortion statutes.
See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (holding that physicians have standing to
challenge abortion statutes because such statutes pose a "direct threat of personal detriment"); Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973) (stating that physicians need not "be required to await and undergo a
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief'); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
481 (1965) (ruling that physicians may "raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom
they have a professional relationship" as a defense to criminal prosecution for providing contraception).
150. See note 98 supra.
January 1994]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:235
Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists'51 that the Court's
abortion decisions (and by implication, all of its privacy decisions) are gener-
ally consistent with the Salerno standard for judging facial challenges? The
answer is an unequivocal no.
As an initial matter, the Court often uses overbreadth analysis in fundamen-
tal rights cases involving rights other than abortion, 152 as well as in cases in-
volving abortion regulations.153 As Justice Scalia himself acknowledges in
Ada, Roe v. Wade154 exemplifies overbreadth analysis.' 55 After setting forth
the standard deemed appropriate for measuring abortion statutes, the Roe Court
employed an analysis indistinguishable from First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine:
Measured against these standards, [the Texas statute], in restricting legal
abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no dis-
tinction between abortions performed early in pregnancy and those performed
later, and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justi-
fication for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitu-
tional attack made upon it here.1 56
Roe hardly presents an anomalous approach, despite Justice Scalia's claim to
the contrary in Ada.157 As Professor Fallon has observed, "virtually all of the
abortion cases reaching the Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade ... have in-
volved facial attacks on state statutes, and the Court, whether accepting or re-
jecting the challenges on the merits, has typically accepted this framing of the
question presented."'158
To support his claim that the Salerno standard applies in abortion cases,
151. 113 S. Ct. 633,633-34 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.
1992).
152. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (facially invalidating a New
York law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives by persons other than licensed pharmacists as an
infringement of the right to make procreative decisions); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
515 (1964) (facially invalidating a provision of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 which prohibited
communist party members from obtaining a passport as "indiscriminately cast and overly broad").
153. Although the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in the Court's most
recent abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), nowhere expressly refers
to abortion as a "fundamental right," the Court's repeated statements reaffirming the essential holding of
Roe v. Wade plainly show that a woman's right to choose to have an abortion retains a preferred status
under the Constitution. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804; id. at 2816, 2817 (joint opinion). We may best
understand the plurality's "undue burden" standard not as an alternative to strict scrutiny, but as an
elaboration of what strict scrutiny allows in the abortion context.
154. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
155. 113 S. Ct. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court "seemingly applied an 'over-
breadth' approach").
156. 410 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
157. 113 S. Ct. at 634.
158. Fallon, supra note 30, at 859 n.29 (citation omitted); see Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled on other grounds, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 8184 (1976). The Court arguably applied the Salerno
approach in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1981), but an alternative explanation exists. See
note 163 infra.
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Justice Scalia in his Ada dissent cites Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services.159 Even on the assumption that a single-
Justice opinion could establish such a proposition in the face of majority opin-
ions to the contrary, Justice O'Connor's Webster concurrence simply does not
support the weight Justice Scalia would have it bear. While Justice O'Connor
cited Salerno to explain her vote to uphold Missouri's ban on the performance
of abortions in publicly funded facilities, 160 she did so only to support a propo-
sition much narrower than the Salerno rule. In Webster, petitioners argued that
the Missouri statute banning funding was invalid because the state could en-
force it "against private hospitals using public water and sewage lines, or
against private hospitals leasing state-owned equipment or state land."'16 Jus-
tice O'Connor rejected the facial attack based on what she deemed "conceiva-
ble applications of the ban."' 62 Her concurrence hardly invoked the Salerno
presumption in its full draconian spirit. Rather, her finding rested on a basic
canon of constitutional adjudication: that, where possible, statutes should be
construed so as to be constitutional.' 63 Virtually all statutes have some "con-
ceivable" unconstitutional applications, but even the most adamant proponent
of overbreadth doctrine would not suggest that these conceivable applications
alone provide a sufficient basis for a statute's facial invalidation.164
Should doubt persist, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Ohio v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health 65 made clear that Justice O'Connor's
159. 492 U.S. at 522-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
160. 1d at 524.
161. Id. at 523.
162. Id.
163. Justice O'Connor stated:
There are... cases in which the Court has held that even though a party will suffer a direct
substantial injury from application of a statute, he cannot challenge its constitutionality unless
he can show that he is within the class whose constitutional rights are allegedly infringed.
One reason for this ruling is that the state court, when actually faced with the question, might
narrowly construe the statute to obliterate the objectionable feature, or it might declare the
unconstitutional provisions separable.
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256 (1953) (citations omitted). This principle could explain the
Court's approach in H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). In that case, the Court refused to invalidate
a Utah statute requiring parental notification of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion. The appellant
challenged the statute as overbroad on its face, contending that it would apply to a mature and "emanci-
pated" minor (i.e., a minor no longer dependent on his or her parents). Following the course taken by
the state courts, the Supreme Court found that the appellant had not offered evidence that she was
"mature" or "emancipated," and upheld the statute on the ground that the appellant, as an "unemanci-
pated minor," lacked standing to make an overbreadth argument. However, the Court may have been
uncertain whether the state court would narrowly construe the statute so as "to exempt demonstrably
mature minors," and hence may have been unwilling to do so itself. Id. at 406. Thus, in accordance
with the Barrows reasoning, the Court may have denied standing to the appellant in Matheson in part
because it did not wish to decide whether the state court would choose to separate the unconstitutional
provision from the rest of the statute in order to remedy its flaw.
164. Federalism presents an additional reason to reject facial invalidity. If a state statute does not
plainly encompass within its scope the allegedly invalid applications, a federal court may assume that
the state's highest court will, in an appropriate case, construe the statute as inapplicable. See Fallon,
supra note 30, at 893 ("A federal court should generally not hold a state statute overbroad if a constitu-
tionally adequate narrowing construction suggests itself." (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 (1965))); text accompanying notes 229-
236 infra.
165. 110 S. CL 2972 (1990).
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invocation of Salerno in her Webster concurrence rested on principles of statu-
tory construction. In the portion of his opinion that Justice O'Connor joined,
Justice Kennedy cited her Webster concurrence, including the Salerno standard,
for the proposition that a court should not invalidate a state statute "on a facial
challenge based upon a worst-case analysis that may never occur." 166 The dis-
cussion around this conclusion makes clear that the "worst-case analysis" refers
to an interpretation of the statutory provision that leads to an unconstitutional
result.' 67 The Court refused to consider what it termed a "dubious" interpreta-
tion of state law by the lower federal courts a sufficient basis for facial invali-
dation, and relied on one of its staple rules that "'[where fairly possible,
courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality."168
Far from showing that fundamental rights cases differ from First Amendment
overbreadth cases, the method of analysis in Justice O'Connor's Webster con-
currence and the opinion of the Court in Akron Center closely followed First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
The Court used the same principle of statutory construction in a First
Amendment case, Burson v. Freeman.169 In Burson, the Court considered a
facial challenge to a Tennessee statute forbidding citizens from soliciting votes
and displaying or distributing campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling
place on election day. In upholding the statute on the ground that it satisfied
strict scrutiny, the plurality rejected the argument that the statute should be
invalidated because the state could conceivably apply it to an individual driving
by a polling place in an automobile with a campaign bumper sticker.' 70 The
plurality explained:
[T]hese arguments are "as applied" challenges that should be made by an indi-
vidual prosecuted for such conduct. If successful, these challenges would call
for a limiting construction rather than a facial invalidation. In the absence of
any factual record to support respondent's contention that the statute has been
applied to reach such circumstances, we do not entertain the challenges in this
case.
171
Thus, while fundamental rights overbreadth doctrine may be as sweeping as
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, it does not cast a wider net. This
stands to reason. Because the same principles justify both fundamental rights
overbreadth doctrine and First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the two ap-
proaches should contain the same limitations, such as the preference for consti-
tutional avoidance through statutory construction illustrated in Akron and
Burson.
Another First Amendment case, Broadrick v. Oklahoma,'7 2 establishes a
closely related limitation applicable in both areas. In Broadrick, the Court nar-
166. Id. at 2981.
167. Id. at 2980-81.
168. Id. at 2980 (quoting Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 .{1983)).
169. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
170. Id. at 1857 n.13 (plurality opinion).
171. Id.
172. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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rowed the scope of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine by adding a require-
ment that, at least when a statute targets conduct as opposed to pure speech,
"the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."'173
Although the Court leaves unclear what constitutes "substantial over-
breadth," the purpose of the limitation is apparent. An unchecked overbreadth
doctrine would invalidate entire statutes otherwise easily "cured" through nar-
row interpretation. A narrowed statute is better than a nonexistent one; its re-
maining parts carry out legitimate governmental interests, and because the law
is not directed at protected activity, it is unlikely to chill protected activity.
Even if some chilling effects result, the substantiality requirement reflects a
judgment that the chilling effects must reach a threshold level before justifying
invalidation of an entire law.
To understand how the substantial overbreadth requirement operates in the
context of fundamental rights overbreadth doctrine, consider a hypothetical
state statute titled "Second Opinion Act," requiring all persons to obtain the
advice of two doctors before undergoing any nonemergency surgical procedure.
Assume the Act's purpose is to decrease the number of unnecessary operations,
and thus promote both health and the containment of medical costs. Now sup-
pose a plastic surgeon who specializes in elective procedures challenges the
law on overbreadth grounds, arguing that the Act as applied to abortions consti-
tutes an undue burden. In applying Broadrick's substantial overbreadth limita-
tion, a court would deny the plastic surgeon's challenge. Because the law does
not target abortion or some other fundamental right, the surgeon must show its
substantial overbreadth; yet, the law does not operate unconstitutionally as ap-
plied to the vast majority of nonemergency surgical procedures.
In its most recent abortion decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'74 the
Court used similar reasoning in upholding a Pennsylvania law's abortion re-
strictions against a facial attack. In Casey, the Court first determined that
Pennsylvania's 24-hour waiting period requirement served a valid purpose that
did not target the right at stake, and was therefore not unconstitutional on that
ground. 175 The Court then addressed whether the 24-hour waiting period none-
theless places an unconstitutional incidental burden on the right to choose to
have an abortion. 176 Based on the factual record before the Court and the fact
173. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
174. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
175. See id. at 2825 ("The idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if
they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the statute
directs that important information become part of the background of the decision.'); see also id. at 2819
('The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the
incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough
to invalidate it.").
176. Id. at 2825. The plurality's assumption that the 24-hour waiting period places an incidental
rather than a direct burden on the abortion right is a dubious one, as even the dissenters noted. See id. at
2878 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., white, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) ("Pennsylvania has consciously and directly regulated conduct that our cases
have held is constitutionally protected."). Pennsylvania did not, after all, require a 24-hour waiting
period for all or even many medical procedures, but only for abortion. Moreover, the law's title, the
January 1994]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
that the attack on the law was facial, the plurality held that the district court's
finding that the waiting period would have a "particularly burdensome" effect
on some women-especially rural and poor women-did not constitute a "sub-
stantial" obstacle.177
The Casey plurality thus applied "substantial overbreadth" analysis. The
Court first determined that the waiting period requirement targeted unprotected
activity. It then asked whether the potentially invalid applications were sub-
stantial when compared to the valid applications. While the Court's use of the
substantial overbreadth doctrine meant that a potentially invalid application
would be insufficient to render a law unconstitutional on its face, the plurality's
focus on "the record before'' 178 it implies that the mere existence of some po-
tentially valid applications would not save an otherwise substantially overbroad
statute.
The Court's substantial overbreadth analysis contradicts the Salerno princi-
ple. Under Salerno, no factual showing of unconstitutional applications can
invalidate a statute that has any constitutional applications. The Casey plural-
ity, by focusing on the record before it, clearly implies that even though they
require substantial overbreadth, they will invalidate significantly more legisla-
tion under that standard than they would under Salerno. Consider the husband
notification provision of the Pennsylvania statute, which the Court struck down
as unconstitutional. The Court states that "in a large fraction of the cases in
which [the husband notification provision] is relevant, it will operate as a sub-
stantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion. It is an undue
burden, and therefore invalid."'' 79 Because the provision operates unconstitu-
tionally in "a large fraction" of cases, the plurality invalidates it on its face,
notwithstanding its constitutional operation in other circumstances.' 80 Under
Salerno, this provision would withstand a facial attack.
In fact, the Court has been applying overbreadth analysis in substantive due
process cases for quite some time, albeit without expressly stating as much.
Justice Scalia's contention to the contrary in his Ada dissent plainly misinter-
prets the Court's opinions.' 8 '
"Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act," strongly suggests that the restrictions, including the 24-hour wait-
ing period, in fact target the abortion right itself. Nevertheless, these criticisms relate to the plurality's
understanding of the underlying substantive right and limits upon it; if we accept the assumption that the
24-hour waiting period imposes a mere incidental burden, then the plurality's application of overbreadth
doctrine parallels the First Amendment doctrine of substantial overbreadth.. See text accompanying
notes 177-181 infra.
177. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2830.
180. In upholding Mississippi's 24-hour waiting period, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the incon-
sistency between the Casey Court's invalidation of Pennsylvania's husband notification provision and
the Salerno standard. The Fifth Circuit, however, ruled that Casey did not overturn "longstanding
Supreme Court precedent governing challenges to the facial constitutionality of statutes." Barnes v.
Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992). Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Souter, indicated in
Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 113 S. Ct. 1668 (1993), that this was no oversight, stating that
in Casey, the Court "did not require petitioners to show that the provision would be invalid in all
circumstances." Id. at 1668-69 (concurring opinion).
181. It should be noted that one substantive due process case, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
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5. The basis of overbreadth doctrine.
I have shown that in fundamental rights cases, the Court applies over-
breadth analysis. To complete the discussion of the doctrine, I explore why the
Court applies it. Does the Constitution require this, or is it judge-made? In
more practical terms, could Congress or the Court modify First Amendment/
fundamental rights overbreadth doctrine as a matter of statutory or common
law? In short, what sort of an animal is overbreadth doctrine?
As discussed earlier, 182 the overbreadth doctrine has two components: (1)
every person's right to be judged by a constitutionally valid law, which the
discussion of Marbury v. Madison makes clear is rooted in the Constitution; 183
and (2) the desire to avoid the chilling effect of overbroad statutes, which some
refer to as "prophylaxis." If a subconstitutional part of overbreadth doctrine
exists, it must lie in its prophylactic component.
Professor Fallon argues that the Constitution requires some form of over-
breadth doctrine in order to protect against "judicial sanction and from chill
arising from the fear of being sued or prosecuted."' 184 He goes on to state,
however, that the Constitution requires no specific version of overbreadth doc-
trine.185 In other words, according to Fallon, the prophylactic component of
the doctrine is judge-made; 186 the Court or Congress would be free to substitute
some other set of overbreadth rules for the set he proposes. 187
Fallon correctly recognizes a constitutional element to prophylaxis. Indeed,
much of the justification for First Amendment rights is prophylactic. Justice
Holmes demonstrated this in his classic answer to the question of why the ad-
vocacy of foolishness, or even evil, deserves protection.
If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away
all opposition.... But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
(1986), quite clearly does not employ overbreadth analysis. The Georgia statute at issue in Hardwick
applied to both homosexual and heterosexual sodomy; yet, as Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, the
Court chose to treat the "case as an 'as applied' challenge," id. at 201, ignoring the fact that the statute
would have a chilling effect on heterosexuals. Id. at 188 n.2. I cannot reconcile Hardwick's approach to
the facial/as-applied question with the Court's approach in other fundamental rights cases, but then,
neither can I reconcile Hardwick's principal holding with most modem substantive due process cases.
See TRuE & DoRu, supra note 115, at 117 (describing the holding of Hardwick as "egregiously
wrong").
182. See text accompanying notes 96-103 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 39-48 supra.
184. Fallon, supra note 30, at 868 n.94.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 875-80. Fallon offers one constitutional caveat to his blanket statement: Courts may
not use a case-by-case approach if doing so violates a defendant's right to fair warning. Id. at 877-78(discussing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 n.7 (1965)). As Fallon notes, however, the re-
quirement of fair warning is not unique to First Amendment (or general fundamental rights) over-
breadth, but applies to all instances of case-by-case narrowing. Id. at 878.
187. Id. at 877-907. Fallon's doctrine includes different rules for the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts. He also argues that the timing of an overbreadth ruling is significant, as is the nature of
the constitutional challenge.
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reached by free trade in ideas .... 188
Because we do not trust ourselves (or our judges) to distinguish between good
and bad ideas, we take the prophylactic measure of protecting all ideas. Of
course, this justification for First Amendment rights in no way diminishes the
constitutional status of those rights. On the contrary, their constitutional status
requires the courts to employ overbreadth doctrine.' 89
Since both components of the overbreadth doctrine are constitutionally
based, the Constitution itself proscribes the use of the Salerno presumption. A
typical overbreadth challenge illustrates this point. A plaintiff claims she can-
not be judged by a statute because, regardless of the status of her own conduct,
the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.
She claims that as long as the statute remains on the books unnarrowed, it will
chill the exercise of First Amendment or other fundamental rights. Further-
more, she claims that the statute's chill itself comprises a significant aspect of
its unconstitutional operation. To understand why applying the presumption of
severability in this context would be constitutionally impermissible, we must
distinguish between actually severing a statute's unconstitutional portions or
applications and presuming severability.
If the court actually declares invalid and severs the unconstitutional por-
tions or applications of the challenged statute, the plaintiff has no constitutional
complaint. The court will now judge her by a constitutionally adequate rule of
law-the statute minus its unconstitutional portions and applications. In con-
trast, when a court presumes severability, it actually upholds the law. In effect,
it tells the plaintiff, "don't worry about any potential unconstitutional applica-
tions of the statute; we'll deal with those when they arise." Whatever general
shortcomings the presumption approach has, 190 the presence of a chilling effect
adds a fatal flaw. The court cannot tell our plaintiff, unlike a litigant who
challenges an overbroad statute with no chilling effect, that the rights of third
parties can be vindicated if and when they are violated. Under the presumption
of severability, third parties whose rights are chilled will not appear before the
court (and, at least in federal court, might not present a case or controversy
even if they did appear). Thus, when the court considers the overbreadth chal-
lenge, applying the Salerno presumption entails judging the litigant by an un-
constitutional rule of law-unconstitutional because, at least for the time being,
it chills the behavior of third parties. For this reason, much of the First Amend-
188. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
189. Consider also the Fourth Amendment. If the police search a person's home without probable
cause, whether or not the police discover evidence of criminal activity, they violate the person's Fourth
Amendment rights. We justify the prohibition not because individuals have a right to engage in criminal
conduct in their home, but rather based on a balancing of values reflected in the Fourth Amendment.
We consider privacy sufficiently important that we forbid the police to peer into a person's home unless
they have probable cause to believe that the individual has sacrificed her right to privacy by engaging in
criminal conduct. Thus, the Fourth Amendment protects us in a world of imperfect information. If
criminals did not have Fourth Amendment rights, the privacy of the innocent would be in jeopardy as
well. The right is justified as a matter of prophylaxis, but once justified, it becomes a full-fledged
constitutional right.
190. See Part III infra.
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ment/fundamental rights overbreadth doctrine precludes the use of the Salerno
presumption as a matter of constitutional, not subconstitutional law.
C. Impermissible Purpose and the Salerno Principle
In a variety of contexts, the Court has held that statutes with an unconstitu-
tional purpose may be found facially invalid.191 This rule comprises another
substantive constitutional norm that precludes use of the Salerno presumption.
If a statute serves an impermissible purpose, courts cannot save it by severing
its unconstitutional applications. 192 The invalid legislative purpose pervades
all of the provision's applications. Indeed, the idea of severing an application
of law from its purpose appears nonsensical.
Still, one might argue that the Salerno principle is technically appropriate in
cases involving an allegedly unconstitutional statutory purpose because, if the
illegitimate purpose pervades all applications, then "no set of circumstances"
exists under which the statute can be validly enforced. But the Salerno princi-
ple focuses on the application of the statute, not its purpose, and thus provides
no guidance when a court examines the constitutionality of a statute's goal.
Ignoring the Salerno principle presents the sounder course when considering
questions of illegitimate purpose.
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause illustrates this point. Under
Lemon v. Kurtzman,193 a law violates the establishment clause if (1) it lacks "a
secular legislative purpose," or (2) its primary effect is to advance or inhibit
religion, or (3) it results in "excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion."'194 Although individual Justices have questioned the Lemon test's con-
tinued vitality,' 95 most agree that a statute with no secular purpose still violates
the Establishment Clause.' 96
The Court applied the purpose prong of Lemon in Edwards v. Aguillard'97
to strike down a state statute on its face. In Edwards, the Court considered the
constitutionality of Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act." While the law did not
191. See text accompanying notes 193-200 infra.
192. Of course, if the purpose of one provision of a statute is invalid, but other provisions serve
valid legislative purposes, then the invalid portion may be severed subject only to conventional sever-
ability constraints. The text therefore discusses only application severability, not clause severability.
193. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
194. l at 612-13.
195. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehn-
quist, C.J., White, J., and Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (remaining within the
Lemon framework "for present purposes," but noting prior criticism of the framework); Aguilar v. Fel-
ton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976)
(White, J., concurring).
196. To date, only two of the Justices who have publicly called for the abandonment of Lemon
have objected to the purpose prong. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 613 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, although sharply divided on the outcome of the case,
all members of the Court applied the purpose prong of Lemon in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589
(1988).
197. 482 U.S. at 578.
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mandate the teaching of either evolution or "creation science," 198 it did require
that if one theory were taught, the other receive equal treatment.' 99 The Court
rejected the state's argument that the law served the secular purpose of promot-
ing academic freedom. The Court found that the law's actual purpose was to
narrow, rather than expand, the science curriculum, 200 and thereby to endorse a
religious view. The Court did not inquire further whether the statute did so in
all of its applications. Edwards firmly establishes that the Salerno presumption
of severability does not apply to facial challenges to statutes with an unconsti-
tutional purpose.
One might take this reasoning a step further and argue, as have four Jus-
tices, that the effect prong of the Lemon test is also inconsistent with the Sa-
lerno approach. In Bowen v. Kendrick,201 the Court upheld the Adolescent
Family Life Act, which authorizes federal grants to religious institutions for
services and research relating to premarital adolescent sexual relations and
pregnancy. In dissent, Justice Blackmun agreed with what he deemed the ma-
jority's assertion that in cases involving facial challenges on Establishment
Clause grounds, the Court rejects the rigid Salerno test and instead assesses the
constitutionality of the enactment according to the three-pronged Lemon test.
20 2
Justice Blackmun argued against use of the Salerno principle to permit a statute
to survive a facial challenge because it could be validly applied under a hypo-
thetical circumstance, noting this would utterly vitiate the "primary effect'
prong of Lemon.203 The Salerno formulation requires that the statute's sole
effect be to advance religion for a court to find it facially invalid. The Lemon
test, by focusing on primary effect, allows a court to render a statute invalid
though it may have some secular effect.2°4
Justice Blackmun's argument that applying Salerno vitiates the Lemon test,
while persuasive, has not been adopted by a majority of the Court. In other
words, the Kendrick dissenters' assertion that even the majority recognized the
inapplicability of Salerno in Establishment Clause cases may have been an
overstatement. True, the Court rejected the government's request that it apply
the Salerno presumption,205 but in so doing it stated: "As in previous cases
involving facial challenges on Establishment Clause grounds .... we assess the
constitutionality of an enactment by reference to the [Lemon test]. 206
Whereas the dissent reads the Court's reference to the Lemon test as a repudia-
tion of the Salerno presumption, the Court may have meant only that the Lemon
198. The Act defined creation science as "'the scientific evidences for [creation] and inferences
from those scientific evidences."' Id. at 581 (quoting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.3(2)). While this
definition is singularly unhelpful, the Court inferred from the Act's legislative history that the term
"embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of human-
kind.' Id. at 592.
199. Id. at 581.
200. Id. at 586-87.
201. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
202. Id. at 627 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 627 n.1 (citing id. at 602).
205. Id. at 602 (opinion of the Court).
206. Id. (citations omitted).
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test supplies the substantive rule of law, regardless of the standard applicable to
facial challenges. 20 7 Thus, while cases like Kendrick and Edwards v. Aguillard
exemplify the proposition that the Salerno presumption does not apply to
Lemon's purpose prong (or other substantive tests which turn on purpose),20 8
whether it applies to the effect prong remains an open question.
D. Concluding Remarks on Constitutional Barriers to the Salerno
Presumption of Severability
The foregoing illustrations do not exhaustively catalogue the substantive
constitutional norms that constrain a court's power to apply the Salerno pre-
sumption of severability. One might interpret these Supreme Court decisions to
mean that the application of the presumption would undermine other constitu-
tional provisions. Indeed, because so many diverse principles of constitutional
law are known to be incompatible with the presumption, one may question its
applicability to any individual case.209
For example, the Court has rejected the severability of statutes when deter-
mining whether due process permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over an absent defendant. In both Wuchter v. Pizzutti2 0 and Shaffer v. Heit-
ner,21' the Court ignored whether or not the particular circumstances of the
defendant justified the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the trial court, hold-
207. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Kendrick, accepted the distinction be-
tween facial and as-applied challenges in the Establishment Clause context, although he acknowledged
that the Court had never before delineated the consequences of this distinction. Id. at 600-02. This said,
Chief Justice Rehnquist took a novel approach to the distinction, treating the factual record developed in
the lower courts as relevant only to the as-applied portion of the constitutional challenge. Id. at 618-22.
This treatment prompted Justice Blackmun to observe that whether a challenge is denominated "facial"
or "as-applied," "the Court should not blind itself to the facts revealed by the undisputed record." Id. at
628 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 627 n.l. I should acknowledge that many statutes serve multiple purposes. For in-
stance, incarceration of criminals serves the purposes of retribution, isolation, deterrence, and perhaps
rehabilitation. The constitutionality of a statute that serves both valid and invalid purposes presents a
question of substantive constitutional law. However, once a statute meets the test for having an invalid
purpose-whether that test focuses on the exclusive purpose, primary purpose, or merely any purpose-
the invalid purpose pervades all of the statute's applications. In the Establishment Clause area, the
Court has utilized different formulae to express the requirements of Lemon's purpose prong. For an
argument that the test properly focuses on the law's primary purpose, see Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d
765, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (D.W. Nelson, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Hawaii's official Good
Friday holiday did violate the Establishment Clause). See also Cammack v. Waihee, 944 F.2d 466, 469-
71 (9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
Provisions of law may also serve different purposes when applied to different circumstances. For
example, suppose that the ingestion of a certain food preservative causes ovarian cancer in women and
prostate cancer in men. Congress might prohibit the sale of the preservative in interstate commerce for
two separate purposes: to prevent ovarian cancer in women and to prevent prostate cancer in men. Such
a statute, which serves entirely distinct purposes depending on the situation, might be an example of a
provision of law where one illegitimate purpose might not pervade all of its other applications. I pre-
sume that such statutes are sufficiently uncommon as to leave intact the general principle that the Sa-
lerno approach does not apply to cases involving an illegitimate purpose. In any event, we might more
properly think of such a statute as two distinct statutes codified in one shorthand provision of law.
209. Contracting the Salerno presumption of severability to a smaller domain would exemplify
what Professor Tribe and I elsewhere have termed "exception-barring" and would suffer from the flaws
inherent in that mode of legal analysis. See TRIBE & DoRu, supra note 115, at 90-95.
210. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
211. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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ing instead that the statute under which service was made proved defective.212
One might dismiss these cases as instances of the Court simply ignoring the
Salerno presumption, 213 but that would disregard the underlying substantive
doctrine that justifies the Court's departure from the presumption.214 More im-
portantly, these cases show that substantive constitutional law constrains sever-
ability doctrine in numerous ways, even in peripheral areas of constitutional
law such as personal jurisdiction.215
At the very least, this discussion demonstrates the gross overstatement of
the Court's pronouncement in Salerno that it has "not recognized an 'over-
breadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." 216
Rather, the Court has enforced numerous substantive constitutional norms by
presuming that unconstitutional applications cannot be severed from constitu-
tional ones. The Court's failure to expressly recognize that in so doing it has
permitted facial challenges outside the First Amendment context does not di-
212. In Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), the Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey
statute that provided that in an action by a resident against a nonresident for injuries resulting from the
nonresident's use of a motor vehicle on a state highway, the summons could be served on the nonresi-
dent's Secretary of State. The Court found the statute defective because it contained no provision that
made it reasonably probable that notice of service would reach the defendant. Although the defendant
had in fact received notice, the Court nevertheless addressed the merits. Id. at 24. Similarly, in Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court held that a Delaware statute allowing the sequestration of
property to compel the personal appearance of a nonresident to defend a suit brought against him vio-
lated the Due Process Clause because it allowed the state to make a binding judgment "against a...
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." Id. at 216 (quoting International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). Yet the particular defendants in Shaffer had considerably
more contact with Delaware than mere ownership of stock in a Delaware corporation; they were mem-
bers of the board of the same corporation. Nonetheless, the Court evaluated the statute, not the particu-
lar facts of the case.
213. See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 12 n.49 (noting that the decision in Wuchteris vulnerable to
criticism for ignoring the "Yazoo presumption").
214. When a state utilizes its long-arm statute to assert personal jurisdiction over an absent de-
fendant, it bases its power to adjudicate claims against the defendant upon her contacts with the state and
upon the procedures authorized for service of process. If the contacts and process are insufficient to
support personal jurisdiction, it should not matter that a different statute might authorize jurisdiction
based on legitimate criteria. The statute under which jurisdiction is authorized ignores these other crite-
ria. Thus, for example, in Shaffer v. Heitner, the defendants' service on the board of a Delaware corpo-
ration arguably would have been sufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts with the forum
state. But the statute made no reference to corporate board membership. 433 U.S. at 190 n.4. One
cannot sever from a statute what does not already exist.
One could, of course, attempt to sever the statute's application to a Delaware corporate board mem-
ber from its application to others. The Court has not generally taken this approach, however, suggesting
that, at least regarding absent defendants, states must have statutory authority for the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction. This premise rests on the apparent distinction between a state court's inherent power
to exercise jurisdiction over persons present within the state, see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720-24
(1877), and the statutory power to subject foreign defendants to state process. Cf. Burnham v. Superior
Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing traditional from nontraditional bases for
personal jurisdiction).
215. I do not mean to suggest that the constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction are unimpor-
tant or insignificant. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that this topic does not have the wide appeal
of other constitutional issues. It would appear more than a bit overstated to argue that due process limits
on territorial jurisdiction "contribute[ ] vitally to the preservation of an open, democratic political re-
gime, at the same time as [they] secure[ ] rights of high importance to particular individuals." Fallon,
supra note 30, at 884 n.192 (discussing the special importance of fundamental rights guaranteed under
the First Amendment).
216. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
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minish the effects of its actions. 217
m11. INSTITUTIONAL LmATs TO THE PRESUMPTiON OF SEVERABILrry
In addition to substantive constitutional law, institutional concerns con-
strain the legitimate use of a presumption of severability. Questions of justifi-
cation for the Salerno presumption raise distinctly different issues depending
on whether the challenges are to federal or to state laws, though the Supreme
Court appears unaware of the distinction. 218 One important distinction lies in
the area of ultimate interpretive authority. On questions of federal law, the
United States Supreme Court retains final authority. In contrast, on questions
of state law, the highest court of the state has the last word. Because the differ-
ence can be significant, I consider state and federal statutes separately.
A. Facial Challenges to State Statutes
When a state statute is challenged on federal constitutional grounds, the
United States Supreme Court219 and the state's highest court share ultimate
217. Cf. JEAN BAPTSTE PoQuELiN MOLRE, LE BOURGEOIS GENMTrHOMME 57 (Yves Brunswick
& Paul Ginestier eds., Librarie Marcel Didier Paris 1968) (1670) (in which Monsieur Jourdain is
overjoyed to learn that he already knows how to speak prose, exclaiming, "Quoi! quand je dis: 'Nicole,
apportez-moi res pantoufles et me donnez mon bonnet de nuit,' c'est de ]a prose?").
218. The Salerno principle finds its first clear expression in Yazoo, a challenge to a state statute.
See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra. Salerno itself involved a challenge to a federal law, and
cases involving both federal and state laws have invoked the Salerno language. See, e.g., Rust v. Sulli-
van, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767 (1991) (upholding the Department of Health and Human Services' regula-
tions interpreting the Hyde Amendment, a provision of federal law, as facially valid); Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989) (upholding a Missouri law banning the use of public
facilities for abortions as facially valid). The Court recently applied the Salerno standard to a federal
regulation facially challenged under the authorizing statute. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct 1439, 1443
(1993).
219. In analyzing the federal courts, I focus on the Supreme Court because a ruling by a lower
federal court that a state statute is facially invalid is not binding in a later action between different
parties in state court. Although no Supreme Court case has squarely decided the question, individual
Justices have taken the position that, on questions of federal law, the state courts are bound only by the
United States Supreme Court, and not by the lower federal courts. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct.
838, 846 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 n.3 (1974) (Rehn-
quist, J., joined by Burger, CJ., concurring); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
joined by White and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). This view has gained widespread acceptance in the
academic literature as well. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federal-
ism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035, 1053 (1977); Fallon, supra note 30, at 853-54;
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HAgv. L. REv. 1130, 1231 n.495
(1986); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U. L. RE,. 759,
771 (1979). State courts also have tended to treat lower federal court precedent as merely persuasive,
nonbinding authority. See Bradshaw v. State, 286 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919
(1974) ("It is axiomatic that a decision of a federal trial court, while persuasive if well-reasoned, is not
by any means binding on the courts of a State."); Fallon, supra note 30, at 854 n.6 (citing cases in which
states have lodged criminal prosecutions against nonparties in a prior lower federal court case which
pronounced a state statute void for overbreadth); Shapiro, supra, at 771 & n.68 (arguing that state courts
generally consider deference to lower federal court decisions a matter of choice, even when habeas
corpus looms on the horizon). One federal appeals court has suggested in dicta that state courts might
be bound by decisions of the federal appeals courts on questions of federal law, but free to ignore the
decisions of federal district courts. In fact, the court noted that a federal district judge's determination of
a federal question "is not even binding on the same judge in a subsequent action." Yniguez v. Arizona,
939 F.2d 727, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1991). To date, no court has adopted this position.
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responsibility for resolving the issue. The highest court of the state interprets
the statute, and the United States Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality
of that interpretation. However, if the United States Supreme Court holds a
state statute unconstitutional, the state court may still salvage it, either by re-
considering the statute's initial interpretation or by severing the unconstitu-
tional portion or applications of the statute from the remainder.220
The Salerno principle, however, contradicts essential principles of federal-
ism that apply to the relations between federal and state courts on matters of
state law. In general, when a federal court must decide a question of state
law-either because the dispute substantively concerns state law221 or because
the court must resolve a preliminary state law question to determine the federal
issue222-the federal court follows the state's highest court.223 Federal courts
do not simply assume that every state would resolve the state law question
identically; yet that precisely describes what happens under the Salerno
approach.
For example, suppose that state X has a rule of statutory interpretation that
holds: "If any clause or application of a statute is unconstitutional, the entire
statute shall be invalid, unless the statute contains a severability clause."
Although we can imagine good reasons why such a rule might be undesir-
able,224 the rule is not unconstitutional. Suppose further that the legislature of
state X enacts a statute which allegedly has both constitutional and unconstitu-
tional applications. If a litigant whose own conduct is not constitutionally priv-
ileged challenges the statute in federal court, the court will uphold the statute,
assuming the statute's unconstitutionality does not stem from a substantive doc-
Even assuming that the standard view is correct, a decision of a lower federal court invalidating a
state statute may often prevent enforcement in state court, especially if the challenge in federal court is
brought as a class action. Res judicata may give a judgment the force it lacks based solely on stare
decisis.
220. A state court may not always be able to salvage a previously invalidated law. For example,
the requirement of fair notice means that, at least in criminal cases, no one may be punished for conduct
occurring between the statute's invalidation and its resurrection. Fallon argues that for overbreadth
doctrine to be most effective, this grace period should extend to all statutes which courts invalidate as
overbroad. See Fallon, supra note 30, at 898-99.
221. Diversity cases, see, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and federal question
cases containing pendent or ancillary claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. HI 1991); United Mine Work-
ers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), are among the situations in which federal courts are
called upon to resolve claims arising under state law.
222. Procedural due process cases fit this paradigm. A federal court looks to state law to deter-
mine if it creates "liberty" or "property" interests which are subject to the procedural protection of the
Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343 (1976) (ruling that a city ordinance
should not be read to confer tenure on all permanent employees).
223. See, e.g., Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 240-41 (1991) (Rehnquist, CJ.,
joined by White and Stevens, JJ., dissenting on other grounds) (stating that where a federal court must
interpret unsettled state law, the court's task is to try to predict how the highest court of that state would
decide the question); Rabatin v. Columbus Lines, Inc., 790 F.2d 22, 24 (3d Cir. 1986) ("If ... the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not articulated the law in this area, we must predict what rule it would
apply.").
224. The unconstitutional applications of the statute may be so far removed from its legitimate
core as to make a rule of nonseverability unwise. This would not be true where important constitutional
rights are involved. See text accompanying notes 95-190 supra.
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trine that precludes the Salerno severability presumption.21
Now suppose that a litigant challenges the same statute in state court and
that the statute contains no severability clause. Unlike the federal court, if the
state court finds that the statute has unconstitutional applications, it will hold
the statute invalid pursuant to state severability law. The contradictory results
in state and federal court are unjustifiable and will lead to forum shopping.
Choice of forum may not be the only problem. After state X's highest court
rules that the statute in question is not severable, we would expect federal
judges to be obliged to treat it as such. Yet, because the Salerno principle does
not expressly address severability questions, federal courts applying Salerno to
state court rulings must ask only whether any circumstances exist under which
the state may enforce the statute. Moreover, even if a federal court follows the
state court's severability ruling, a litigant challenging the statute in federal
court prior to a definitive state court severability determination would not bene-
fit; a final judgment in federal court upholding the statute based on the Salerno
principle would preclude relitigation.
If the Salerno presumption of severability (in cases not involving the sub-
stantive norms discussed in Part II) accurately reflected the law of every state,
it might be justifiable. Although state law is remarkably uniform on questions
of severability, the Salerno presumption does not encapsulate the law of any
state. None of the fifty states employs an irrebuttable presumption of severabil-
ity. In forty-eight states, whether by judicial decision, statute, or both, courts
presume statutes to be severable unless the party claiming nonseverability can
show that: (1) severance would leave an incoherent statute, or (2) the legisla-
ture would not have enacted the statute without the invalid portion. The two
remaining states, Tennessee and Virginia, have a presumption of nonsever-
ability, rebuttable by showing the opposite of these two propositions. In prac-
tice, however, Tennessee and Virginia severability cases differ little from those
in other states.226
As a result, we cannot justify the Salerno presumption of severability as a
reflection of state law. Assuming that a federal court could appropriately sub-
stitute a generalized version of state severability law for the particular state law
in question,227 the correct approximation would be a rebuttable presumption of
225. See Part II supra.
226. I summarize the severability law of each state in the appendix.
227. Although the federal courts arguably have limited power to formulate subconstitutional rules
of federal common law, see, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-17 (1981) (ruling that
federal common law is applicable where no state or federal statute exists that directly addresses the area
of dispute); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. Ray.
883 (1986) (arguing that federal common law rulemaking powers are broader than generally believed);
Meltzer, supra note 219, at 1167-76 (arguing that federal courts have rightfully developed a common
law in many specialized areas despite prohibitions against a federal general common law), justifying a
federal common law of severability remains difficult. If we consider the Salerno presumption a rule of
federal common law, both federal and state courts could apply it. Yet why would a state court ignore
state law principles of statutory construction in determining whether a state statute is severable in favor
of a federal common law of statutory construction? Certainly no authority supports the application of
federal rules of severability in the case of a statute invalidated under a state constitution. Nonetheless, if
a state court held invalid a state statute under both the federal and state constitutions, a federal common
January 1994)
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
severability, since that represents the law in nearly all jurisdictions.228 Such a
rebuttable presumption, however, is incompatible with Salerno's "no set of cir-
cumstances" test.
Federal courts' ability to follow state severability law is impaired by the
fact that the uniformity of state severability law in principle disguises differ-
ences in application. Faced with identical statutes, courts in two states may,
and often do, reach different conclusions as to severability. Furthermore, fed-
eral courts do not always reliably predict whether a state's highest court would
deem severable a particular application of a state statute.
In such instances (subject to the substantive limits discussed in Part HI), a
federal court might justifiably choose to abstain from ruling on a facial chal-
lenge pending resolution of the severability question by the state courts. Under
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 22 9 if a state court resolution of a
difficult and unsettled question of state law would avoid the necessity of decid-
ing a federal constitutional question, federal courts should abstain from enter-
taining the constitutional challenge unless unreasonable delay would result.
The Pullman doctrine's justification readily applies to questions of sever-
ability.230 Pullman reflects a judgment that the risk of an unnecessary decision
of federal constitutional law, premised on an erroneous view of state law, out-
weighs the harm that results when a litigant challenging a state statute must re-
file her suit in state court. This judgment does not turn on whether the federal
constitutional question may be avoided by a state court's ruling as to a statute's
application rather than to its severability. 231
law of severability would oblige the court to apply federal sevembility principles to the statute insofar as
it violated the United States Constitution and state severability principles to the statute insofar as it
violated the state constitution. This anomaly would occur even though the federal and state constitutions
invalidate the identical provisions and applications of the statute.
Thus, principles of federalism suggest that a federal court should apply state severability law when
considering a facial challenge to a state statute. The task is hardly foreign to the federal courts. For
example, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992), the Court rejected the recommendation of
the Special Master suggesting reassertion of the severability issue in a state court. Id. at 803. The Court
reasoned that, at least with respect to cases within its original jurisdiction, complete relief should be
afforded, even if in so doing the Court must resolve a question of state law. Id. In other cases, the Court
has discretionary authority to address state severability questions. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286,
289-91 (1924) (remanding to state supreme court the question of whether a provision of state legislation
closely related to a federal provision found unconstitutional by the Court was severable from the Act).
228. Principles of federalism may constrain state severability law. As in other contexts, state
courts may not manipulate state law for the purpose of defeating federal rights. See, e.g., NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958) (holding that a state court could not manipulate
state law so as to defeat the right to freedom of association); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 399
(1955) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that state law, though rightly and honestly applied, may not inter-
fere with plaintiffs right not to be discriminated against). Thus, a state may not create one set of
severability rules for challenges to state statutes based on federal grounds and another more permissive
set for challenges based on state law. This limitation on a state's ability to discriminate against federal
rights should apply to federal challenges to state laws regardless of whether litigants bring suit in state or
federal court. See Meltzer, supra note 219, at 1158-85.
229. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For an overview of the Pullman doctrine, see generally BATOR E AT.,
supra note 55, at 1359; Field, supra note 73.
230. The Pullman doctrine pertains directly only to situations in which a provision of state law
may be inapplicable to the challenging litigant's conduct.
231. Cf Fallon, supra note 30, at 899-900 (arguing that the federal courts should use their broad
discretion to proffer solutions that reinforce our federal form of government).
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Pullman abstention on severability grounds is likely the exception rather
than the rule. In the absence of applicable substantive constitutional limits on
severability analysis,2 2 state law will deem a statute's unconstitutional applica-
tions severable in most facial challenges to state statutes. Of the remaining
cases, courts will frequently be able to hold the applications nonseverable,
either because the severed statute would be plainly incoherent or because it
would clearly violate the intent of the legislature. Thus, federal courts should
follow Pullman abstention only in the borderline cases.233
Facial challenges to state statutes in federal court may raise statutory con-
struction considerations quite apart from severability issues. As the discussion
of overbreadth in the abortion context illustrates,234 when the validity of a stat-
utory provision turns on its applicability to persons not before the court, the
court need not presume that a state court would construe the statute in an un-
constitutional manner as applied to those persons. Rather, federal courts should
assume that state courts would prefer a construction of the statute that renders it
constitutional. 235 Conversely, if the statute plainly covered the conduct in
question, the federal court would not assume that the state court would interpret
it at odds with its language. 236
In sum, when a federal court upholds a state statute against a facial chal-
lenge on the basis that the statute could be construed to avoid constitutional
infirmities, the court, in effect, abstains from rendering a decision of state law
pursuant to Pullman. Therefore, the party challenging the statute should be
allowed to refile her challenge in state court. Abstention, as a doctrine of com-
ity, does not require that state laws be insulated from constitutional scrutiny.
The concerns addressed in this section are based on principles of federal-
ism. Consequently, most are inapplicable in state court. When a state statute is
challenged in state court on federal constitutional grounds and the court wishes
to avoid a federal constitutional holding, the principle that no person may be
judged by an unconstitutional rule of law requires the state court to decide the
case on state statutory grounds-whether rooted in severability doctrine or in a
judgment that the statute does not reach certain conduct. Thus, although the
Salerno irrebuttable presumption of severability is never appropriate, the under-
lying substantive constitutional doctrine may justify the application of a close
cousin of Salerno. This more moderate principle may help channel state law
questions into state court, an entirely appropriate result in light of the federal-
ism concerns I have discussed.
232. Pullman abstention would not be appropriate in First Amendment or other fundamental rights
overbreadth cases where the cost of abstention is to perpetuate a law's unconstitutional chilling effect
while the federal court awaits an authoritative severability ruling by the state's highest court.
233. The test for determining when "an issue of state law [is] sufficiently 'unsettled' or 'unclear'
to warrant abstention under the Pullman doctrine . . . does not emerge easily from analysis of the
decisions .... " BATOR ErT AL., supra note 55, at 1359.
234. See text accompanying notes 141-168 supra.
235. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 (1983) ("Where fairly
possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality.").
236. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987) (holding that a city ordinance
was not susceptible to a limiting construction as its language was plain and unambiguous).
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B. Facial Challenges to Federal Statutes
If a litigant challenges a federal statute on federal constitutional grounds in
the United States Supreme Court,237 the Court can give an authoritative con-
struction to the statute in the course of deciding the constitutional challenge,
apply the familiar canon of constitutional avoidance, 238 or, should this expedi-
ent be unavailable, render a final determination on the severability of the statu-
tory phrases and applications. In the case of a federal statute, the Court need
not predict or presume anything about severability.
The traditional test to determine whether the Court should treat an invali-
dated provision of a federal statute as severable from the remainder differs little
from the standard applicable in each state. As one commentator noted: 'The
oft-stated test of severability [asks] whether Congress would have passed the
statute absent the invalidated section. '239 Like the state formulae it resembles,
this general rule offers little instruction. A richer understanding of federal sev-
erability law can be gleaned from the cases.
I.N.S. v. Chadha240 exemplifies the modem Court's approach to severabil-
ity. In Chadha, the Court invalidated the one-house legislative veto provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act241 because it authorized Congress to
legislate without complying with the constitutional requirements of bicamera-
lism and presentment to the President. Before addressing the constitutional
question, the Court considered the argument, advanced by Congress, 242 that the
Court could not sever the legislative veto provision from the remainder of the
Act.
Notably, the Court treated severability as a threshold question, terming the
nonseverability argument a "challenge[ ] to the authority of this Court to re-
237. For simplicity, I focus here on the United States Supreme Court. Most of the following
observations, however, also apply with nearly equal force to cases involving facial challenges to federal
statutes in the lower federal courts as well as the state courts since these courts are bound by the same
federal constitutional and statutory law as the United States Supreme Court.
In addition, many of the following points also apply to cases involving state statutes challenged in
state court on state constitutional grounds. In such a case, the highest court of the state determines both
the meaning and the legitimacy of the statute under the state's constitution. There is, however, one
caveat. while the doctrine of separation of powers to some extent shapes the practice of the United
States Supreme Court in evaluating federal statutes, such considerations will not be applicable to cases
brought in a state court that is bound by a state constitution that lacks a separation of powers principle.
See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) ("[T]he separation-of-powers principle... has no
applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the states."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 255 (1957) ("[T]he separation of powers... concept is not mandatory in state governments.");
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902) (holding that adherence to separation of powers at the state
level is for the determination of the state). Still, many state constitutions contain a principle of separa-
tion of powers, and, as to these states, the separation of powers considerations discussed in this section
are relevant.
238. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
239. Note, The Aftermath of Chadha: The Impact of the Severability Doctrine on the Management
ofIntragovernmental Relations, 71 VA. L. REv. 1211, 1213 (1985).
240. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
241. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1988)).
242. 462 U.S. at 931. The Immigration and Naturalization Service took the position that the
legislative veto was unconstitutional, agreeing with respondent Chadha. The Court held that Congress
could intervene as an appropriate party to defend the provision's constitutionality.
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solve" the underlying constitutional question. 243 Although, strictly speaking,
the Court would not have lacked the authority to consider the constitutionality
of the legislative veto if the Court found it nonseverable, the basic point re-
mains sound: Severability presents a question of statutory interpretation, and
courts should avoid deciding a constitutional question by resolving a statutory
one whenever possible.
Thus, we derive our first principle of federal severability law: Subject to
the substantive limits discussed in Part I[, courts should address severability
before constitutionality. Especially in facial challenge cases, treatment of sev-
erability as a preliminary issue can obviate the need to resolve a constitutional
question. 244
Chadha also sheds light on the proper treatment of severability clauses. As
the Court noted, the Immigration and Nationality Act's inclusion of a severabil-
ity clause meant that "Congress itself has provided the answer to the question
of severability .... -245 One might think that a clause providing that, "[i]f any
particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby"246 would have disposed of the severability issue. Yet the Court
treated the clause as raising only a presumption of severability, rebuttable by a
showing of contrary congressional intent. Only after canvassing Congress' rea-
sons for enacting the relevant provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act did the Court conclude that the "legislative history is not sufficient to rebut
the presumption of severability raised by" the severability clause.247
Why did the Court in Chadha treat the severability clause as establishing a
rebuttable rather than an irrebuttable presumption of severability? One possi-
bility is that overriding a severability clause may be necessary when severing
an unconstitutional provision or application would leave a nonsensical or un-
workable statute.248 For example, suppose that Congress were to pass a statute
243. Id. at 929, 931 n.7.
244. Chadha itself was not a facial challenge. Instead, the respondent mounted an as-applied
attack to § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2), which gave either
house of Congress the power to override the Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation of an
otherwise deportable alien. Congress argued that the legislative veto provision could not be severed
from the remainder of § 244 of the Act. Since invalidation of § 244 in its entirety would have negated
the Attorney General's authority to suspend deportation of the respondent, a holding of nonseverability
would have defeated Chadha's claim to relief. By contrast, in a typical overbreadth case, a finding of
severability denies relief to the party challenging an act of Congress. This distinction does not, how-
ever, alter the basic analysis in the text. In short, if the resolution of a severability question-in either
direction-avoids the need to resolve a constitutional question, the Court will address the severability
question first.
245. 462 U.S. at 932.
246. Id. (quoting § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101) (emphasis
removed).
247. Id. at 934; see also United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,585 n.27 (1968) (stating that "the
ultimate determination of severability will rarely turn on the presence or absence of [a severability]
clause"); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312 (1936) (noting that the determination of severabil-
ity will, in the end, turn on the intent of the lawmakers).
248. See, e.g., Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 70-72 (1922) (holding the Future Trading Act nonsev-
erable where valid and invalid provisions were inextricably intertwined). Curing one constitutional
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requiring: (1) the licensing of all common carriers doing business in interstate
commerce; and (2) the payment of a tax of 95% of the value received by any
common carrier doing business in interstate commerce without a license. As-
sume that a court holds. the licensing scheme invalid because the required pro-
cedures violate procedural due process. Even if the statute contains a
severability clause, a court could reasonably hold the taxation provision non-
severable from the licensing provision. Consider the alternative: A court
might hold the licensing scheme void, but find the taxation provision severable.
After all, a high tax on interstate commerce presents no per se constitutional
violation. But if the manifest purpose of the tax is to punish those who do not
comply with the registration requirement, then a court should treat the registra-
tion requirement and the tax as nonseverable. We might characterize this as
rebutting the severability clause's presumption, as Chadha suggests, or, to be
more faithful to the text of a severability clause, we might describe the registra-
tion requirement and the tax penalty as a unitary "provision" within the mean-
ing of the severability clause. Under this interpretation, the provision no longer
falls within the clause's scope.
Chadha also suggests that even if severance leaves a workable, coherent
statute, a court may nonetheless override a severability clause on a showing
that, as a historical matter, Congress would not have enacted the statute absent
the clause in question. In looking at the political process of enactment, the
Court asks whether the statute's invalid provision was so critical to the bargain
Congress struck that the legislation would not have been passed in its ab-
sence.249 For instance, in Chadha, the Court found that Congress considered
the burden of private immigration bills so onerous that it would have delegated
authority to the Attorney General to suspend deportations anyway, even with-
out reserving a legislative veto.250 Obviously, such findings are tenuous. As
Justice White noted in his Chadha dissent, the legislative veto may just as well
have played a central role in Congress' willingness to grant these additional
powers to the Attorney General. 25 '
To summarize, current federal severability law turns on the same two-part
infirmity by severance may create other constitutional problems, especially in criminal cases. See Rob-
ert L. Stem, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REv. 76, 87-89
(1937) (discussing reasons for the Court's inconsistent treatment of severability). Stem argues that
different rules ought to apply to civil and criminal cases. Id. Although he recognizes that this distinc-
tion is unsupported by the cases, he suggests that considerations of fair notice-always a greater factor
in criminal than civil cases-constrain severability doctrine. Id. In short, Stem posits that, regardless of
whether there is a severability clause, the requirement of due process prohibits severing a criminal law's
unconstitutional provisions if such severance might render individuals unable to discern acts that are
criminal under the statute from those that are not. See note 80 supra.
249. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-32. The Court later focused explicitly on the congressional bar-
gaining process in another legislative veto case, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
After concluding that the statutory program in question could function absent the legislative veto, the
Court turned to "Itihe more relevant inquiry . . .[of] whether the statute will function in a manner
consistent with the intent of Congress.' Id. at 685 (emphasis in original). One important factor in
determining this intent, according to the Court, is "the importance of the [invalidated legislative] veto in
the original legislative bargain .... Id.
250. 462 U.S. at 935 n.8.
251. Id. at 979 n.16 (White, J., dissenting).
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test that the states use. A court can hold an invalid provision of a statute sever-
able if: (1) the remaining statute functions as a coherent whole; and (2) the
evidence does not show that Congress would not have enacted the statute ab-
sent the invalid provision. 252 While the first portion of the test appears unob-
jectionable, the second part-focusing on Congress' legislative bargain-
requires a more rigorous analysis.
Contrary to the Court's analysis in Chadha, if the statute in question con-
tains a severability clause, the clause should settle the matter of congressional
intent. Speculating whether Congress, faced with different circumstances,
would have passed a statute it did not in fact pass is a considerably more uncer-
tain enterprise than searching legislative history for the meaning of a statute
Congress did pass. Moreover, even if a court knew that Congress would not
have enacted a statute absent the invalidated provision, that hardly provides a
sufficient basis for invalidating the entire statute. By including a severability
clause, Congress knowingly took the risk that a court would invalidate a part or
an application of the statute and let stand the remainder, subject to the substan-
tive constitutional limits outlined in Part II and the requirement of a workable
statute-even though Congress would not have initially enacted the remainder
as a separate statute2 53
In practice, the second prong of the severability test-whether Congress
would have passed the statute absent a specific provision-may carry no real
force. For example, in the recent case of New York v. United States, 54
although the Court stated the traditional two-part severability test,255 it only
applied the first prong, focusing exclusively on how the statute functioned ab-
sent the invalid provision. The Court concluded: "The purpose of the Act is
not defeated by the invalidation of the take title provision, so we may leave the
remainder of the Act in force."'' 6 Indeed, the Court has never actually refused
to sever a statute solely on the historical basis that Congress would not have
passed it absent the invalid provision.2-57
Because the statute in question in New York v. United States had no sever-
252. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam) C"'Unless it is evident that the Legis-
lature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which
is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.") (quoting Champlin
Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
253. Since the Court has interpreted severability clauses as establishing only a rebuttable pre-
sumption of severability, see note 259 infra, one might wish to apply that rule of construction to statutes
enacted in reliance upon it. Any judicial change in the effect given to severability clauses should there-
fore be prospective only.
254. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
255. Id. at 2434 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
256. Id.
257. The Court has, however, held acts of Congress nonseverable because it could not tell whether
or not Congress would prefer severability. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 (1982) (plurality opinion) (refusing to sever bankruptcy judges' jurisdic-
tion over state law claims from the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978). In doing so,
however, the Court did not rely solely on the historical evidence of the congressional bargaining pro-
cess, but essentially applied a presumption of nonseverability without explanation. See id. at 95 n.3
(,Vhite, J., dissenting).
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ability clause,258 this case presented an opportunity to use its legislative history
to discern Congress' actual intent.259 The Court's failure to do so illustrates the
weakness of the second prong of severability analysis. The only real test of
severability for all practical purposes is whether the remaining statute can func-
tion as a coherent whole.260
As Chadha and New York illustrate, the function-onented severability test
may rest on principles of legislative supremacy and judicial restraint. The first
principle dictates that courts will not disturb congressional policies reflected in
legislation, except insofar as the Constitution requires. The second principle
plays a more subtle role. Since the Court addresses severability first, before the
merits of a constitutional claim-and because this inquiry's result will usually
support severability-the Court can avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudica-
tion. These policies provide a strong justification for applying the existing
standard to facial challenges just as to other cases presenting severability
issues.
Nonetheless, the standard's heavy bias towards finding statutes severable
threatens the separation of powers between Congress and the judiciary. A co-
rollary of legislative supremacy is the principle that the judiciary should not
rewrite statutes. Shrill accusations of "legislation from the bench" ring hollow
when only the interpretation of the Constitution or an act of Congress is at
stake,261 but the cries may ring true when the Court severs an invalid statutory
provision. In so doing, it substitutes a judicially rewritten law, stating, "there
258. 112 S. Ct. at 2434.
259. The Court makes no presumption based on the absence of a severability clause. "In the
absence of a severability clause," the Court has noted, "Congress' silence is just that-silence-and
does not raise a presumption against severability." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 680, 686
(1987) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 684 (1971) (plurality opinion)); United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 n.27 (1968).
260. The Court's severability approach appears to exemplify the "public choice" school of statu-
tory interpretation. As Judge Easterbrook once expressed it, "judicial predictions of how the legislature
would have decided issues it did not in fact decide are bound to be little more than wild guesses." Frank
H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 548 (1983). Thus, the Court's reluctance to
employ legislative history to override the presumption of severability seems consistent with public
choice theories. However, public choice theory also postulates that a statute has no spirit or purpose
apart from the concrete deal a legislature struck in a given enactment. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. Ry. 4,
15-17 (1984). This principle suggests that the presumption of severability is itself mistaken. Under
public choice theory, courts should presume that Congress intended exactly the statute it enacted.
Hence, if a court invalidates any provision, public choice theory suggests that the court should invalidate
the whole statute.
Because public choice theory cannot explain federal severability law, a different theoretical frame-
work must be found to justify it. That framework is most likely to be found in a nonintentionalist school
of statutory interpretation which nevertheless allows some scope for legislative purpose. For examples
of such theories, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
Rav. 405 (1989) (arguing that courts should follow congressional instructions or, in their absence, norms
that focus disputes over statutory meaning on the underlying issues); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. Rv. 1479 (1987) (outlining a method of dynamic judicial inter-
pretation of statutes in light of their current and historical context).
261. Cf. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439, 2451 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined
by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (recognizing "that judges in a real sense
'make' law").
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shall be a legal duty X except under circumstance Y" for the law actually en-
acted, "there shall be a legal duty X."
Judicial willingness to stand in for Congress not only blurs the lines of
power between the branches, 262 but also encourages congressional laziness in
matters of constitutional principle. Members of Congress, no less than judges,
are constitutionally obligated to obey the Constitution. So long as Congress
knows that constitutional infirmities in its legislation will affect only minimally
the remainder of its work, the incentive to pass only constitutional laws dimin-
ishes. At worst, strict judicial enforcement of severability clauses, coupled
with a preference for severability even in the absence of such clauses, encour-
ages Congress to view the constitutionality of its statutes as solely a judicial
matter.
To some extent, the constraints placed on severability law by the substan-
tive doctrines explored in Part II help to check congressional incentives to abdi-
cate its constitutional responsibility. Recall that if Congress passes a law to
defeat a constitutional guarantee, the law's invalid purpose will infect the entire
statute. Moreover, overbreadth analysis of laws infringing First Amendment
and other fundamental rights encourages legislative attention to the Constitu-
tion.263 The risk of congressional laxity may therefore only be substantial
when Congress neither aims at constitutional safeguards nor infringes First
Amendment or other fundamental rights.
The question remains whether severability law should be substantially re-
formed. I would argue that it should not. For even if the built-in substantive
safeguards leave us uneasy about whether Congress recognizes its duty to en-
force the Constitution, this concern alone does not justify a complete overhaul
of severability law. Ideally, when the Court applies its severability test and
asks whether what remains of a statute after severing the invalid provision "'is
fully operative as a law,"'264 it should be aware that part of what makes a
statute "operative" is its passage in accordance with constitutionally prescribed
procedures. In the end, judicially crafted rules can only go so far towards en-
suring that Congress fulfills its constitutional role. The ultimate responsibility
rests with Congress itself.
262. The view that each branch of government exercises only a limited power-the legislature
creates laws, the executive executes them, and the judiciary interprets them-is, of course, an oversim-
plification. In reality power is allocated much more subtly. In Justice Jackson's justly famous words:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles
torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
263. Fallon, supra note 30, at 888-89 (suggesting that legislators' fear of having statutes com-
pletely invalidated encourages them to write narrower laws when regulating expressive activity).
264. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corpo-
ration Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
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CONCLUSION
United States v. Salerno suggests that a court confronted with a facial chal-
lenge to a state or federal statute should simply ask whether the law is capable
of any constitutional applications. If it is, the challenge fails. As I argue
above, that standard finds little support in the Supreme Court's cases and is
unsound in principle. Moreover, the Salerno principle contains a more basic
flaw: It assumes all constitutional cases divide neatly into categories of "fa-
cial" and "as-applied" challenges, and that one set of rules suffices for all possi-
ble situations in each category.
The distinction between as-applied and facial challenges may confuse more
than it illuminates. 265 In some sense, any constitutional challenge to a statute is
both as-applied and facial. It is as-applied in the sense that adjudication in
federal court, and often in state court, requires that the statute be applied to the
litigant to create a case or controversy. Every challenge to a statute is also
facial in that it attacks the statute that authorized the contested government
action.266 Thus, although I have used the terms "facial" and "as-applied"
throughout this article, tracking the Court's vocabulary, the discussion above
reveals that the proper approach to a constitutional case typically turns on the
applicable substantive constitutional doctrine and the institutional setting, not
the classification of a case as a facial or as-applied challenge. Abandoning
Salerno and eliminating the distinction between facial and as-applied chal-
lenges would focus courts more sharply on the real issues-both subconstitu-
tional and constitutional-at the core of any challenge to a statute.
Courts should work to avoid constitutional questions altogether by constru-
ing challenged statutes to make them constitutional, or by severing unconstitu-
tional provisions or applications from the particular provisions or applications
before the court. If this fails, however, the subconstitutional policy of constitu-
tional avoidance must give way to more fundamental substantive and institu-
tional constitutional norms.
265. Prior to 1988, the Supreme Court could not entirely avoid distinguishing facial from as-
applied challenges because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964) provided for mandatory appellate jurisdiction in all
cases in which a state's highest court either sustained a state statute against a claim that it violated a
federal law or invalidated a federal statute. The Court granted only discretionary review by way of a
petition for a writ of certiorari in cases in which a court questioned the constitutionality of a statute or in
which a constitutional "title, right, privilege or immunity" was claimed. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964). Jus-
tice Brandeis argued that the most natural reading of the then-current provision would have allowed an
appeal of an unsuccessful "facial" challenge, but jurisdiction only by way of certiorari in other constitu-
tional cases. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 293-303 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,
joined by Clarke, J., dissenting). But the Court did not follow that course. Id. at 287-90. Instead,
Justice Van Devanter, author of the opinion in Yazoo, wrote for the Court in Dahnke-Walker that, since a
statute may only be challenged in its application to a particular litigant, the distinction proffered by
Justice Brandeis would eliminate appellate jurisdiction entirely. Id. at 289 (citing Yazoo & Miss. Valley
R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912)). Nonetheless, in subsequent cases the Court did not
allow all unsuccessful constitutional claims to be heard on writ of error, leading to considerable confu-
sion over the facial/as-applied distinction. See generally BATOR Er AL., supra note 55, at 717-21. Now
that Congress has eliminated virtually all of the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1988), this reason for distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges has vanished.
266. Discriminatory enforcement of a neutral statute is best seen as a challenge to the discrimina-
tion, simpliciter, and not to the statute.
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APPENDIX
Severability Law in the Individual States
As discussed above,267 state severability law is remarkably uniform. Every
state except Tennessee and Virginia employs a presumption of severability,
unless the statute in question includes a nonseverability clause. In general,
state courts hold that provisions and applications of statutes are severable.
I list below the most recent severability case from the highest court in each
state. For those states in which the general rule of severability is codified, I
give the statutory provision and language.
ALABAMA
City of Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So. 2d 1312 (Ala. 1987).
ALASKA
Sonneman v. Hickel, 836 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1992).
The Alaska Statutes contain a general severability provision:
Any law heretofore or hereafter enacted by the Alaska legislature which lacks a
severability clause shall be construed as though it contained the clause in the
following language, "If any provision of this Act, or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this Act and the
application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby."
ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.030 (1990). The provision creates only a weak pre-
sumption in favor of severability. Sonneman, 836 P.2d at 941.
ARIZONA
Republic Inv. Fund v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 800 P.2d 1251 (1990).
ARKANSAS
Cartwright v. Carney, 286 Ark. 121, 690 S.W.2d 716 (1985).
CALIFORNIA
Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr.
161 (1989).
COLORADO
People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181 (Colo. 1992).
Colorado's severability doctrine is codified at CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-
4-204 (West 1989), which provides:
If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid, unless it ap-
pears to the court that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and
267. See text accompanying note 226 supra.
January 1994]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it
cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions
without the void one; or unless the court determines that the valid provisions,
standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accord-
ance with the legislative intent.
CONNECTICUT
Payne v. Fairfield Hills Hosp., 215 Conn. 675, 578 A.2d 1025 (1990).
The Connecticut General Statutes contain a universal severability provision:
"If any provision of any act passed by the general assembly or its application to
any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications of such act." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-3
(West 1988).
DELAWARE
In re Oberly, 524 A.2d 1176 (Del. 1987).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 308 (1985) provides:
If any provision of this Code or amendments hereto, or the application thereof
to any person, thing or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not
affect the provisions or application of this Code or such amendments that can
be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end the
provisions of this Code and such amendments are declared to be severable.
FLORIDA
Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1572
(1992).
GEORGIA
Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827, 400 S.E.2d 916 (1991).
HAWAII
State v. Bloss, 62 Haw. 147, 613 P.2d 354 (1980).
IDAHO
Lynn v. Kootenai Fire Protective Dist. No. 1, 97 Idaho 623, 550 P.2d 126
(1976).
ILLINOIS
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 558
N.E.2d 89 (1990).
INDIANA
Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991).
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Indiana also has a severability statute:
(b) Except in the case of a statute containing a nonseverability provision,
each part and application of every statute is severable. If any provision or
application of a statute is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect the remain-
der of the statute unless:
(1) the remainder is so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so
dependent upon, the invalid provision or application that it cannot be pre-
sumed that the remainder would have been enacted without the invalid pro-
vision or application; or
(2) the remainder is incomplete and incapable of being executed in accord-
ance with the legislative intent without the invalid provision or application.
IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-1-8 (West 1981).
IOWA
Western Int'l v. Kirkpatrick, 396 N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 1986).
Iowa law includes a general severability provision in its statutory construc-
tion section:
If any provision of an Act or statute or the application thereof to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or
applications of the Act or statute which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the Act or statute are
severable.
IOwA CODE ANN. § 4.12 (West 1989).
KANSAS
State v. Rupert, 802 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1990).
KENTUCKY
Kentucky Mun. League v. Commonwealth Dep't of Labor, 530 S.W.2d 198
(Ky. 1975).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.090 (Baldwin 1992) provides:
It shall be considered that it is the intent of the General Assembly, in enacting
any statute, that if any part of the statute be held unconstitutional the remaining
parts shall remain in force, unless the statute provides otherwise, or unless the
remaining parts are so essentially and inseparably connected with and depen-
dent upon the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the General Assem-
bly would not have enacted the remaining parts without the unconstitutional
part, or unless the remaining parts, standing alone, are incomplete and incapa-
ble of being executed in accordance with the intent of the General Assembly.
LOUISIANA
State v. Russland Enter., 555 So. 2d 1365 (La. 1990).
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MAINE
Bayside Enter. v. Maine Agric. Bargaining Bd., 513 A.2d 1355 (Me. 1986).
Maine has a general statutory construction statute which sets forth its sever-
ability presumption:
The following rules shall be observed in the construction of statutes, unless
such construction is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the enactment.
8. Severability. The provisions of the statutes are severable. The provisions of
any session law are severable. If any provision of the statutes or of a session
law is invalid, or if the application of either to any person or circumstance is
invalid, such invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications which
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application. The repeal of
a severability clause located in and applicable to any title or a division of a
title, chapter, section or Act, must be construed as the removal of surplus lan-
guage unless the law indicates otherwise.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 71 (West Supp. 1992).
MARYLAND
Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 608 A.2d 1222
(1992).
MASSACHUSETTS
Mayor of Boston v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 384 Mass. 718, 429 N.E.2d
691 (1981).
MICHIGAN
Baldwin v. North Shore Estates Ass'n, 384 Mich. 42, 179 N.W.2d 398 (1970).
Michigan has a statutory severability presumption, MIcH. Comp. LAws
ANN. § 8.5 (West 1992), which reads:
8.5. Severability clause
Sec. 5. In the construction of the statutes of this state the following rules shall
be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest
intent of the legislature, that is to say: If any portion of an act or the applica-
tion thereof to any person or circumstances shall be found to be invalid by a
court, such invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions or applications of
the act which can be given effect without the invalid portion or application,
provided such remaining portions are not determined by the court to be inoper-
able, and to this end acts are declared to be severable.
MINNESOTA
Johnson Bros. Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 402
N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1987).
Minnesota has a statutory severability presumption, MN. STAT. ANN.
§ 645.20 (West 1993), which reads:
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645.20. Construction of severable provisions: Unless there is a provision in the
law that the provisions shall not be severable, the provisions of all laws shall be
severable. If any provision of a law is found to be unconstitutional and void,
the remaining provisions of the law shall remain valid, unless the court finds
the valid provisions of the law are so essentially and inseparably connected
with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the court cannot presume
the legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the
void one; or unless the court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing
alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with
the legislative intent.
MISSISSIPPI
Quinn v. Branning, 404 So. 2d 1018 (Miss. 1981).
MISSOURI
Millsap v. Quinn, 785 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1990).
MONTANA
Ingraham v. Champion Int'l, 243 Mont. 42, 793 P.2d 769 (1990).
NEBRASKA
Robotham v. State, 241 Neb. 379, 488 N.W.2d 533 (1992).
NEVADA
Brewery Arts Ctr. v. State Bd. of Examiners, 108 Nev. 1050, 843 P.2d 369
(1992).
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
NEW JERSEY
Chamber of Commerce v. State, 89 N.J. 131, 445 A.2d 353 (1982).
NEW MEXICO
Bradbury & Stamm Constr. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226, 372 P.2d
808 (1962).
NEW YORK
Association of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v. State, 79 N.Y.2d 39,
588 N.E.2d 51, 580 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1992).
NORTH CAROLINA
Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 270 S.E.2d 482 (1980).
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NORTH DAKOTA
First Bank of Buffalo v. Conrad, 350 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1984).
North Dakota has a statutory severability presumption, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 1-02-20 (1987) which reads:
1-02-20. Interpretation. In the event that any clause, sentence, paragraph,
chapter, or other part of any title, is adjudged by any court of competent or
final jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment does not affect, impair, nor in-
validate any other clause, sentence, paragraph, chapter, section, or part of such
title, but is confined in its operation to the clause, sentence, paragraph, section,
or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment has
been rendered.
OHIO
Emmons v. Keller, 21 Ohio St. 2d 48, 254 N.E.2d 687 (1970), overruled on
other grounds by Delozier v. Sommer, 38 Ohio St. 2d 268, 313 N.E.2d 386
(1974), and Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 41 Ohio St. 2d
120, 322 N.E.2d 880 (1975).
Ohio has a statutory severability provision, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.50
(Anderson 1990), which reads:
1.50 Severability of Code section provisions. If any provisions of a section of
the Revised Code or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is
held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of
the section or related sections which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions are severable.
OKLAHOMA
Tulsa Exposition & Fair Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 468 P.2d 501
(Okla. 1970).
OREGON
City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or. 490, 714 P.2d 220 (1986).
For acts of the Oregon Legislative Assembly, the severability principle has
been codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 174.040 (1990), which provides:
It shall be considered that it is the legislative intent, in the enactment of any
statute, that if any part of the statute is held unconstitutional, the remaining
parts shall remain in force unless: (1) The statute provides otherwise; (2) The
remaining parts are so essentially and inseparably connected with and depen-
dent upon the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the remaining parts
would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional part; or (3) The re-
maining parts, standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed
in accordance with the legislative intent.
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PENNSYLVANIA
Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 499 Pa. 246, 452 A.2d 1337
(1982).
Pennsylvania has a statutory severability provision, 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1925 (1992), which reads:
The provisions of every statute shall be severable. If any provision of any
statute or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
the remainder of the statute, and the application of such provision to other
persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby, unless the court finds
that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably con-
nected with, and so depend upon, the void provision or application, that it can-
not be presumed the General Assembly would have enacted the remaining
valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the remain-
ing valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being
executed in accordance with the legislative intent.
RHODE ISLAND
Landrigan v. McElroy, 457 A.2d 1056 (R.I. 1983).
SOUTH CAROLINA
Thayer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 307 S.C. 6, 413 S.E.2d 810 (1992).
SOUTH DAKOTA
Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757 (S.D. 1985).
TENNESSEE
In Tennessee, there is a stated presumption against severability, or, as the
Tennessee courts often call it, elision. See, e.g., Vollmer v. City of Memphis,
730 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tenn. 1987) (stating presumption exists against sus-
taining remaining part of statute, where part has been declared unconstitu-
tional). But, cf., Lowe's Cos. v. Cardwell, 813 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tenn. 1991)
(explaining that "under the doctrine of elision, a court may, under appropriate
circumstances and in keeping with the expressed intent of a legislative body,
elide an unconstitutional portion of a statute and find the remaining provisions
to be constitutional and effective").
The "presumption against severability" seems to have coalesced in Chief
Justice Green's opinion in Heymann v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 151 Tenn. 21, 28,
266 S.W. 1043, 1045 (1924), where he wrote: "Some of us do not believe that
elision is permissible to save an act otherwise bad under the two-subject clause
of the Constitution." Justice Green proceeded to outline the test for severabil-
ity: "Certainly elision is not permissible in any case if the result so attained will
defeat the legislative intent." Id.
The stated presumption notwithstanding, in practice Tennessee severability
law resembles the law of other states. Generally, "where a part of a statute is so
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interwoven with other portions of an act that we cannot suppose that the legis-
lature would have passed the act with that clause omitted, if such clause is
declared void it renders the whole act null." Hobbs v. Lawrence County, 193
Tenn. 608, 615, 247 S.W.2d 73, 76 (1952).
Tennessee courts will apply the rule of elision if they determine that "the
legislature would have enacted [the statute] with the objectionable features
omitted.... provided, of course, there is left enough of the act for a complete
law, capable of enforcement and fairly answering the object of its passage."
Gibson County Special Sch. Dist. v. Palmer, 691 S.W.2d 544, 551 (1985).
TEXAS
Association of Tex. Professional Educators v. Kirby, 788 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.
1990). TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 312.013 (West 1993) provides:
312.013. Severability of Statutes.
(a) Unless expressly provided otherwise, if any provision of a statute or its
application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does
not affect other provisions or applications of the statute that can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
the statute are severable.
(b) This section does not affect the power or duty of a court to ascertain
and give effect to legislative intent concerning severability of a statute.
UTAH
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
VERMONT
Bagley v. Vermont Dep't of Taxes, 146 Vt. 120, 500 A.2d 223 (1985).
VIRGINIA
Like Tennessee, Virginia courts describe Virginia severability doctrine as a
presumption against severability. Paraphrasing the United States Supreme
Court's language in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312-13 (1936),
quoted with approval in Hannabass v. Maryland Casualty Co., 194 S.E. 808,
813 (Va. 1938), the Virginia Supreme Court in Board of Supervisors v. Rowe,
216 S.E.2d 199 (Va. 1975), described the rule concerning severability:
Absent a severability provision, a legislative act is presumed to be non-severa-
ble, and the burden of proving severability is upon the supporter of the legisla-
tion. Where a severability provision is included, a legislative act is presumed
to be severable, the burden of proving non-severability is on the assailant of the
legislation, and the presumption of severability must be overcome by consider-
ations which establish the clear probability that the legislature would not have
been satisfied with what remains after elimination of the invalid parts.
Id. at 214. Regardless of the presence of a severability provision, "the determi-
[Vol. 46:235
FACIAL CHALLENGES
nation, in the end, is reached by applying the same test-namely, What was the
intent of the lawmakers?" Hannabass, 194 S.E. at 813.
While the presence of a severability provision provides the Virginia courts
with a rule of construction that may sometimes aid in determining legislative
intent, "'it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command."' Rowe, 216 S.E. at
214 (quoting Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924)).
Thus, both Tennessee and Virginia determine severability much the same
way as do the rest of the states; the only difference is that the starting point is a
presumption against severability. In Robinson v. Commonwealth, 232 S.E.2d
742, 744 (Va. 1977), the Virginia Supreme Court stated that "the test of sever-
ability is whether the legislature would be satisfied with the remainder after the
invalid portions have been eliminated; the intent of the legislative body
controls."
WASHINGTON
City of Seattle v. Stite, 103 Wash. 2d 663, 694 P.2d 641 (1985).
WEST VIRGINIA
Anderson's Paving, Inc. v. Hayes, 170 W. Va. 640, 295 S.E.2d 805 (1982).
The relevant part of West Virginia's statutory construction provision reads:
§ 2-2-10 Rules for construction of statutes.
The following rules shall be observed in the construction of statutes, unless
a different intent on the part of the Legislature be apparent from the context:
(cc) Unless there is a provision in a section, article or chapter of this code
specifying that the provisions thereof shall not be severable, the provisions of
every section, article or chapter of this code, whether enacted before or subse-
quent to the effective date of this subdivision [March 30, 1973], shall be sever-
able so that if any provision of any such section, article or chapter is held to be
unconstitutional or void, the remaining provisions of such section, article or
chapter shall remain valid, unless the court finds the valid provisions are so
essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the uncon-
stitutional or void provision that the court cannot presume the Legislature
would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the unconstitutional
or void one, or unless the court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing
alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with
the legislative intent: Provided, That if any such section, article or chapter of
this code has its own severability clause, then such severability clause shall
govern and control with respect to such section, article or chapter in lieu of the
provisions of this subdivision.
W. VA. CODE § 2-2-10 (1990).
WISCONSIN
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. City of Superior, 131 Wis. 2d 564, 388 N.W.2d
916 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987). Wisconsin has a statutory con-
struction provision which provides:
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In construing Wisconsin laws the following rules shall be observed unless con-
struction in accordance with a rule would produce a result inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the legislature:
(11) SEVERABILITY. The provisions of the statutes are severable. The pro-
visions of any session law are severable. If any provision of the statutes or of a
session law is invalid, or if the application of either to any person or circum-
stance is invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applica-
tions which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 990.001 (West 1985).
WYOMING
Bell v. Gray, 377 P.2d 924 (Wyo. 1963).
